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THE SEATTLE COMPROMISE:
MULTICULTURAL SENSITIVITY AND
AMERICANIZATION
DORIANE LAMBELET COLEMAN†
Obstetrician to Pregnant Woman: “If it’s a boy, do you want him
circumcised?”
Pregnant Woman: “Yes, and also if it’s a girl.”1
An effective society—one that can accomplish its common goals, fa-
cilitate the private ends of its members, and nourish its system of
values—requires that newcomers achieve at least a modest degree of
assimilation into its culture.2
INTRODUCTION
As the United States seeks to accommodate a large number of
non-European and thus culturally distinct immigrants for the first
time in its history,3 it is increasingly faced with significant cultural
† Lecturing Fellow, Duke University School of Law.  B.A. 1982, Cornell University; J.D.
1988, Georgetown University Law Center.  Many thanks to James E. Coleman, Jr., Katharine
T. Bartlett, Jerome McCristal Culp, Anne Dellinger, Stanley Fish, John Payton and William W.
Van Alstyne for reviewing and commenting on a draft of this Article.  Thanks also to my re-
search assistants, Robin Whitlock and A.C. Walters, and to the ABA Section on Individual
Rights and Responsibilities for including me on the extraordinary female genital mutilation
panel discussion that prompted my work on this issue.  It was a particular honor to exchange
views with Alison Dundes Renteln, Mimi Ramsey, and Karen Musalo, other panelists who
have contributed so much to the continuing debate about female genital mutilation.
1. Tom Brune, Refugees’ Beliefs Don’t Travel Well; Compromise Plan on Circumcision of
Girls Gets Little Support, CHI. TRIB., Oct. 28, 1996, §1, at 1.
2. Peter H. Schuck, Membership in the Liberal Polity: The Devaluation of American Citi-
zenship, in IMMIGRATION AND THE POLITICS OF CITIZENSHIP IN EUROPE AND NORTH
AMERICA, 51, 60-65 (William Rogers Brubaker ed., 1989).
3. Before 1965, United States immigration laws severely restricted the ability of non-
Europeans to immigrate to the U.S.  The 1965 immigration reforms, see Immigration and Na-
tionality Act Amendments of 1965, Pub. L. No. 89-236, 79 Stat. 911 (codified as amended in
scattered sections of 8 U.S.C.), which followed closely behind the Civil Rights Act of 1964, see
Pub. L. No. 88-352, 78 Stat. 241 (codified at 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000(a)–(h)(6)), permitted, for the
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collisions which challenge both its legal and civic tradition of toler-
ance and its ability to resolve these collisions in a manner that does
not destroy what the majority believes are important aspects of
American culture.4  Reconciling these two predominant values is
both a classic legal and philosophical dilemma for American democ-
racy, and an urgent contemporary problem.
Historically, American law and its underlying political philoso-
phy have resolved the tension between tolerance and a unified cul-
ture by applying the doctrine of ordered liberty. Ordered liberty pro-
vides for freedom within assumed societal goals and values as
opposed to freedom from assumed goals and values.5  Specifically,
first time, large numbers of non-Europeans to enter the United States.  Since then, the majority
of immigrants to the United States has come from these continents, rather than from Europe.
See Doriane Lambelet Coleman, Individualizing Justice Through Multiculturalism: The Liber-
als’ Dilemma, 96 COLUM. L. REV. 1093, 1120-21 & n.149 (1996) (summarizing the history of
U.S. immigration laws and the cultural phenomenon caused by the relatively recent influx into
the U.S. of  non-Europeans).
4. As a “nation of immigrants,” the United States has always been confronted by cultural
collisions among various immigrant groups.  For example, there has long been a debate about
the propriety of having a “national language.”  See, e.g., Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 402-
03 (1923) (holding unconstitutional a Nebraska law that prevented parents from schooling their
children in German despite the state’s view that schooling in English was necessary to assure
integration into the national culture).  The most recent collisions, however, are more difficult to
resolve because our contemporary pluralism is much more adventurous than that which pre-
dated the immigration reforms of 1965.  See Coleman, supra note 3, at 1120-21 & n.149
(describing the 1965 reforms).  For example, because in the past immigrants to the United
States usually shared a common European heritage, the divisive issue was primarily language;
today, the typical immigrant is from Asia or Africa or Latin America, and the divisive issues
are language and cultural practices such as marriage-by-capture, parent-child suicide, and fe-
male genital mutilation.  See id. at 1105-06, 1109-10, 1111-13 (describing these various cultural
traditions). These cultural traditions challenge our tolerance in unprecedented ways because,
among other things, they are inconsistent with values like equal protection and the rule of law,
which themselves generally are held to be among the better aspects of American culture.  See
id. at 1166-67; see also infra notes 242-67 and accompanying text (discussing “Americanization”
and “American culture.”)
5. See Poe v. Ullman, 367 U.S. 497, 518 (1961) (Douglas, J., dissenting) (describing the
doctrine of ordered liberty).  Justice Douglas’s dissent in Poe described the doctrine as a
mechanism to separate acceptable from unacceptable conduct:
The due process clause is said to exact from the states all that is “implicit in
the concept of ordered liberty.”  It is further said that the concept is a living one, that
it guarantees basic rights, not because they have become petrified as of any one time,
but because due process follows the advancing standards of a free society as to what
is deemed reasonable and right.  It is to be applied, according to this view, to facts
and circumstances as they arise, the cases falling on one side of the line or the other
as a majority of nine justices appraise conduct as either implicit in the concept of or-
dered liberty or as lying without the confines of that vague concept.
Id. at 518 n.9 (Douglas, J., dissenting) (quoting OWEN J. ROBERTS, THE COURT AND THE
CONSTITUTION 80 (1951)).
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ordered liberty permits cultural pluralism within boundaries that the
majority is willing to tolerate, so that the liberty we are afforded is
not unfettered, but rather bounded by prevailing social dictates.6  For
example, although individuals are normally accorded great freedom
in the way they choose to conduct their private lives and family rela-
tions,7 legal and social tolerance cease where those relations tran-
scend societal bounds or are found to be “subversive of good order.”8
As a matter of constitutional due process, the freedoms that are deeply rooted in this na-
tion’s history and tradition are considered to be “implicit” in the concept of ordered liberty.
See Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, 191-92 (1986) (concluding that a statute criminalizing
sodomy was constitutional on the ground that sodomy fell outside the bounds of ordered lib-
erty). Thus, conduct that is consistent with this history and tradition will generally fall within
the concept of ordered liberty and be protected from governmental intrusion absent a very
good reason, whereas conduct that is not will fall outside of its boundaries and be subject to
relatively unfettered governmental regulation.  See id. at 191-94, 196.  Note, however, that
while this analysis is focused on history and tradition, the breadth of the individual freedoms
associated with that history and tradition assures that the doctrine of ordered liberty does not
necessarily exclude minority cultural or religious practices.  Justice Douglas’s dissent in Poe
makes this same point.  See Poe at 518 (Douglas, J., dissenting). See also infra notes 6 and 12
(describing the nature of the analysis under the doctrine of ordered liberty as inclusive of con-
temporary cultural issues.)
6. Ultimately, whatever society gives up in the course of this balancing of individual free-
dom against the larger social good, the better aspects of American culture, or those traditions
which the majority most values, should be left intact.  See, e.g., Coleman, supra note 3, at 1166-
67 (arguing that multiculturalism must defer to the majority when that doctrine irreconcilably
conflicts with values such as equal protection and the rule of law).  Those traditions that are
thought to be inside or outside the bounds of what this country will allow, however, are con-
stantly evolving as the norms of society change.  See BILL ONG HING, TO BE AN AMERICAN:
CULTURAL PLURALISM AND THE RHETORIC OF ASSIMILATION 154 (1997) (suggesting that
immigrants help to develop our constantly evolving culture).
7. See Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 166-67 (1944) (delineating the standard for
family privacy, which protects “a realm of family life which the state cannot enter”); see also
Moore v. City of East Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494, 503 (1977) (concluding that the right to choose
how to structure family relations is “deeply rooted in this Nation’s history and tradition”).
8. Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145, 164 (1878) (upholding a law punishing polyg-
amy).  Compare Prince, 321 U.S. at 165 (upholding a law punishing a guardian who allowed her
child ward to proselytize on the street at night because that religious practice was inconsistent
with children’s “opportunities for growth into free and independent well-developed men and
citizens”), and Hardwick, 478 U.S. at 196 (upholding a state statute criminalizing sodomy be-
cause the majority views that practice as “immoral and unacceptable”), with Wisconsin v. Yo-
der, 406 U.S. 205, 222 (1972) (holding unconstitutional the application of a state law punishing
Amish parents for their practice of withdrawing their adolescent children from school, because
that community “has been a highly successful social unit within our society”), and Meyer v.
Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 400 (1923) (holding unconstitutional the application of a state law
punishing German parents for teaching their primary school-aged children in that language,
because “[m]ere knowledge of the German language cannot reasonably be regarded as harm-
ful” to the ability of citizens to acquire American ideals), and Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268
U.S. 510, 534 (1925) (holding unconstitutional the application of a state law requiring parents
to send their children to public school because the private schools at issue “effectively dis-
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As Stanley Fish explains in the context of the First Amendment,
where the question is “how far . . . the freedom of religion from state
scrutiny [should] extend given that it is the function of the state to se-
cure good order and stability,” the answer our law and society give is
“[t]olerate as much as you can so long as the basic shape of the en-
terprise, whether spiritual or civil, is not compromised; identify a
base-line level of obligation that leaves believers free to live out
their faiths within limits and provides the magistrate with a measure
for determining when those limits are breached and a justification
for enforcing them.”9
This classic doctrine has been challenged recently by some mod-
ern multiculturalists who disagree with rulings the Supreme Court
has made under its auspices, or who tout the merits of unbounded
tolerance for individual and group difference.10  Largely in response
charged their obligations to patrons” and employed “teachers . . . of good moral character and
patriotic disposition”).
The United States Commission on Immigration Reform recognized the continuing social
vitality of the doctrine of ordered liberty when it noted in its Report to Congress that
“American unity depends upon a widely-held belief in the principles and values embodied in
the American Constitution and their fulfillment in practice” and that “[e]thnicity and religious
diversity based on personal freedom is compatible with national unity.” U.S. COMM’N ON
IMMIGRATION REFORM, BECOMING AN AMERICAN: IMMIGRATION AND IMMIGRANT POLICY,
A REPORT TO CONGRESS, Executive Summary 5 (1997).  This view is correct only so long as
the doctrine of ordered liberty serves as the mechanism for resolving disputes that arise when
the exercise of ethnic or religious diversity clash with the principles and values embodied in the
American Constitution.
9. Stanley Fish, Mission Impossible: Setting the Just Bounds Between Church and State,
97 COLUM. L. REV. 2255, 2261 (1997).
10. As Michael Lind notes:
The multicultural left[ ] . . . believe[s] that the melting-pot conception of
American identity has been, or should be, repudiated in favor of a new understand-
ing of American society as a “mosaic” of five races or racelike communities—whites,
blacks or African-Americans, Hispanics or Latinos, Asian and Pacific Islanders, and
native Americans.  These races are not mere ingredients to be blended in a future
unity, but permanently distinct communities, like the Francophone and Anglophone
populations in Canada, or the German, French, Italian, and Romansch nationalities
in Switzerland.  Each of the five American races has its own distinct culture, to which
immigrants belonging to that race are expected to assimilate (Mexicans and Cubans
join Hispanic America; Chinese, Indians and Filipinios join Asian-and-Pacific-
Islander America, and so on).  Moreover, each race, in addition to preserving its cul-
tural unity and distinctness, should act as a monolithic political bloc (particularly
since white Americans, according to the multicultural left, are guilty of racial bloc
voting).  Those who criticize the fivefold race-culture-political bloc scheme are, by
definition, racists who wish to turn back the clock to the era of white supremacy.
MICHAEL LIND, THE NEXT AMERICAN NATION: THE NEW NATIONALISM AND THE FOURTH
AMERICAN REVOLUTION 98 (1995); see also HING, supra note 6, at 163-70 (describing this
same perspective as “ideological separatism,” and arguing that its existence is “undeniable”
and is largely a reaction to majority racism).  For an example of such a perspective in legal
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to opponents of modern immigration, who seek to create or re-create
a culturally-pure (i.e., white) America,11 these multiculturalists argue
that legal and social boundaries drawn by European-Americans are
inherently racist or ethnocentric, and should therefore not apply in
the new multicultural America.12  While proponents of this view gen-
erally do not make their argument explicitly, it is a necessary result of
the piecemeal argument that particular minority groups—whether
indigenous or immigrant—should be permitted both as a legal and a
cultural matter to engage in traditional or religious practices that fall
outside of the larger society’s assumed goals and values.  Thus, for
example, it has been argued that a “cultural defense” to immigrant
crime, which affords the defendant a culturally subjective assessment
of guilt and punishment, is necessary to assure that individuals are
not improperly judged according to laws designed by white men.13
scholarship, see Leti Volpp, Talking “Culture”: Gender, Race, Nation, and the Politics of Mul-
ticulturalism, 96 COLUM. L. REV. 1573, 1600-11 (1996) (arguing that because any boundaries
that might be established would be set by a majority that is racist and sexist, those boundaries
would lack moral authority and should not govern immigrant communities).  For different rea-
sons, libertarians also argue that individual freedom should not be restrained by the mores of
the majority.  See, e.g., William N. Eskridge, Jr., Privacy Jurisprudence and the Apartheid of the
Closet, 1946-1961, 24 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 703, 771 (1997) (describing the libertarian philosophy
as “protecting the individual against state invasion of a socially defined private realm of free-
dom”).
11. See, e.g., PETER BRIMELOW, ALIEN NATION: COMMON SENSE ABOUT AMERICA’S
IMMIGRATION DISASTER 264 (1995) (arguing that when the government reformed the immi-
gration laws in 1965, it reneged on an “explicit[ ] promise[ ]” to keep the racial balance of the
U.S. primarily white, and that Americans have a right to insist that “their government stop
shifting it . . . [and] to insist that it be shifted back”).
12. See, e.g., Volpp, supra note 10, at 1609 & n.173 (describing Brimelow and others as
“right-wing demagogues” whose “neoconservative version of multiculturalism” must be re-
jected).  This argument has at least superficial appeal, since a person must show that a cultural
or personal freedom or practice is “deeply rooted in this Nation’s history and tradition” to re-
ceive the utmost protection from governmental intrusion under the doctrine of ordered liberty.
See Hardwick, 478 U.S. at 192 (quoting Moore, 431 U.S. at 503).  The appeal is only superficial,
however, since among those matters which are accepted as “deeply rooted,” and thus pro-
tected, are very broad categories of freedoms (including religious freedom and the freedom to
conduct family relations) that subsume many of the controversial traditional practices of con-
temporary immigrants.
13. See Volpp, supra note 10, at 1595-600 (calling for “color consciousness” in the law as a
way to combat “subordination” of people of color and women); id. at 1616-17 (arguing that to
“refus[e] an explicit consideration of ‘race’ or ‘culture’ within our legal system will . . . result . . .
in a replication of dominant patterns of dispersal of power”).  As I described elsewhere, “[t]he
affirmative presentation of foreign customs as exonerating evidence in criminal cases where
both the defendant and his victim are from the same culture, known in the legal literature as
the immigrant ‘cultural defense,’ is perhaps the clearest example of how multiculturalism has
influenced the law . . . . The defense assumes that ‘someone raised in a foreign culture should
not be held fully accountable for conduct that violates United States law . . . [if that conduct]
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The logical effect of such a doctrine would be to create a balkanized
legal system and a country without fixed legal boundaries, where the
rules of social conduct depended upon the ethnicity of the actor.14  In
any event the doctrine certainly does not allow for the boundaries
currently fixed by white men.
Despite the energy with which this argument is made and one’s
individual views concerning the propriety of particular decisions of
the Supreme Court, the doctrine of ordered liberty is alive and well
as the paradigm that governs and, more importantly, should govern
the way we resolve cultural collisions and other conflicts between in-
dividual freedom and the necessary social order.  Without such bal-
ancing—which, again, assures that both of these constitutional values
are given consideration in each collision between the two—American
society would effectively be forced to choose between one of two de-
plorable states: the anarchy of complete freedom or a social order de-
fined exclusively by the current ethnic majority.15
This Article demonstrates the continued relevance of the doc-
trine of ordered liberty in the context of our contemporary plural-
would be acceptable in his or her native culture.’”  Coleman, supra note 3, at 1100-01 (quoting
Melissa Spatz, Note, A “Lesser” Crime:  A Comparative Study of Legal Defenses for Men Who
Kill Their Wives, 24 COLUM. J.L. & SOC. PROBS. 597, 620 (1991) (citations omitted)).
14. See supra note 13 (defining the cultural defense).  As I have argued elsewhere, allow-
ing a cultural defense to immigrant-on-immigrant crime would have the effect of renewed
apartheid in the law.  See Coleman, supra note 3, at 1144.  Rather than having only two legal
systems—one black and one white—however, the new apartheid would be multiplied by all of
the immigrant or minority groups that could show they had legal or cultural traditions that were
different from those of the majority.  When people argue on behalf of the cultural defense be-
cause the law otherwise is ethnocentric, patronizing, and/or racist, they are wittingly or unwit-
tingly setting at least the theoretical stage for such apartheid, and for a balkanization of Ameri-
can society generally.  But cf. Volpp, supra note 12, at 1594-600, 1609-16 (criticizing my view in
this regard and arguing that the cultural defense is appropriately used in a context where
American culture and its legal tradition, because of its history of racism, cannot otherwise be
fair to immigrants).
15. As Professor Fish has explained, this is merely a political reality: “[I]n the absence of
common ground there can be no state and no laws . . . common ground will be what emerges
(temporarily) when one party wins the right (through war, elections, dynastic succession, etc.)
to determine the decorums of proper behavior.”  Fish, supra note 9, at 2264.
To argue that the doctrine of ordered liberty is necessary in a pluralistic society to assure
both that individual and group differences are respected and that the society does not become
fragmented, is not to say that every decision the courts reach under its auspices is correct.  For
example, there is a substantial argument that the Supreme Court was wrong to allow states to
classify sodomy as an illegal practice that is subversive of good order or otherwise inconsistent
with prevailing social dictates.  See Hardwick, 478 U.S. at 196 (finding that a majority of Geor-
gia voters viewed “homosexual sodomy [as] immoral and unacceptable”).  The fact that the
Court may sometimes be wrong, however, does not diminish the value of the doctrine as a nec-
essary tool to resolve conflicts between the majority and minority groups or individuals.
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ism.16  It is about an effort by a group of Somali immigrants in Seattle
that tested to the maximum the boundaries and integrity of the
American tradition of tolerance: These immigrants sought to have
their daughters symbolically circumcised by a state hospital; the pro-
cedure would have involved no tissue removal or subsequent scar-
ring, and, according to those concerned, would have prevented the
immigrants from seeking to have their daughters cut in the traditional
way.  The Article is also about the extraordinary sensitivity some
members of the Seattle community displayed in addressing the immi-
grants’ cultural and religious concerns, the sometimes predictable
and sometimes surprising ways others inside and outside of the com-
munity reacted, and the lessons, both large and small, that can be de-
rived from the episode.  Ultimately, the Article demonstrates the
value of ordered liberty as a pragmatic tool to achieve solutions to
cultural collisions which otherwise are embedded in the quagmire of
theory and rhetoric created by cultural relativists, anti-immigrant as-
similationists, and, as this Article will show, sometimes even by well-
meaning liberals.
Part I describes the background of the domestic and interna-
tional discussions concerning the issue of female genital mutilation
(FGM).  It focuses particularly on the practical and theoretical obsta-
cles, largely ignored and even in some instances created by Western
opponents, to the eradication of the practice throughout the world.
In this context, Part I discusses the sincere belief of many practitio-
ners, including immigrants, that female circumcision is mandated by
their religion.  It also addresses the argument among Western femi-
nists and cultural relativists concerning both the substance of the cul-
tural critique of FGM and the manner in which that critique is made.
Highlighted in this context is the particularly thorny theoretical im-
passe created by charges of barbarism and patriarchy from one side,
and imperialism and ethnocentrism from the other.
Part II sets out the facts of the Seattle dispute and compromise.
It describes the immigrant community’s overtures to the hospital; the
cultural and religious bases for the immigrants’ belief that the cir-
cumcisions are required; the hospital’s initial rejection of the immi-
grants’ requests, as well as its efforts to resolve the matter through
compromise with the immigrant community; the proposal to perform
ritual or symbolic circumcisions that was suggested by the hospital’s
16. See supra notes 3-4 and accompanying text (describing this contemporary pluralism).
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review committee; and the resulting public outcry that ultimately de-
stroyed the proposal.
Part III addresses the legal issues implicated by the hospital’s
proposal, including the impact of the federal statute banning FGM, of
state child abuse laws, and of equal protection doctrine.  It concludes
that the proposal did not contravene federal law, and that where the
circumcisions are only symbolic, the Equal Protection Clause re-
quires that child abuse laws be read to treat boys and girls similarly:
either no parent is accommodated, and no child is cut (absent a suc-
cessful exception on religious grounds for either), or all parents are
accommodated, and both boys and girls are cut.
Part IV explores more particularly the merits of symbolic cir-
cumcision.  It discusses the principal argument of its opponents—that
even in its limited form, the procedure would have been abusive and
would have lent legitimacy to the more severe forms of the tradi-
tional practice.  It also discusses the argument that the compromise
procedure would have defeated the process of Americanizing the
immigrants at issue.  It weighs these arguments against those of the
procedure’s proponents: that the procedure was necessary to assure
the eradication of the more severe forms of FGM in that community;
that it assured both the moral and medical sensitivity sought by cul-
tural relativists; and that rather than detracting from the Americani-
zation process, it was entirely consistent with its underlying require-
ment of a transition period.  This Part concludes that the proposal
should have been implemented for the reasons suggested by its pro-
ponents.  In doing so, it argues that the hospital’s proposal fits within
the paradigm of ordered liberty by assuring both multicultural sensi-
tivity and the successful Americanization of immigrants.
The Article concludes that despite its premature demise, the Se-
attle compromise provided a provocative and useful model for other
Western communities that seek to address the very important issue of
FGM.  It also suggests that the process the hospital undertook to ad-
dress the immigrants’ concerns can be useful to address other cultural
collisions which, at first glance, may appear to pose irreconcilable dif-
ferences, but which, upon more careful examination, are ripe for
compromise.
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I.  THE POLITICAL AND THEORETICAL CONTEXT OF THE FEMALE
GENITAL MUTILATION DISCUSSION
The traditional practice that some feminists and human rights
activists have dubbed “female genital mutilation” (FGM)17  has re-
ceived much public attention over the past ten years.  Outrage over
reports that many cultures and some Muslims require the excision of
portions or all of a young girl’s external genitalia has captivated the
17. The debate over the propriety of this term has raged since the inception of Western
efforts to eradicate the traditional practice it describes.  Indeed, footnotes such as this, recog-
nizing and describing the controversy over nomenclature, have become almost de rigeur in re-
cent articles discussing the subject.  See, e.g., Isabelle R. Gunning, Arrogant Perception, World-
Traveling and Multicultural Feminism: The Case of Female Genital Surgeries, 23 COLUM. HUM.
RTS. L. REV. 189, 193-94 n.15 (1992); Hope Lewis, Between Irua and “Female Genital Mutila-
tion”: Feminist Human Rights Discourse and the Cultural Divide, 8 HARV. HUM. RTS. J. 1, 1-2
n.4 (1995); Barrett A. Breitung, Comment, Interpretation and Eradication: National and Inter-
national Responses to Female Circumcision, 10 EMORY INT’L L. REV. 657, 662 n.17 (1996).
It is the position of most Western opponents of the traditional practice that its various
forms and the manner in which it is performed justify the term “mutilation,” particularly given
that in its “mildest form, clitoridectomy . . . is anatomically equivalent to amputation of the pe-
nis.”  Nahid Toubia, Female Circumcision as a Public Health Issue, 331 NEW ENG. J. MED. 712,
718 (1994).
On the other hand, some members of the cultures that practice FGM, as well as many
cultural relativists, insist that the term is judgmental, patronizing, and imperialistic, and that
these perceptions ultimately hamper any real communication between the Western opponents
of FGM and their counterparts in the cultures that engage in the practice, who traditionally
have preferred the term “female circumcision.”  See, e.g., Kay Boulware-Miller, Female Cir-
cumcision: Challenges to the Practice as a Human Rights Violation, 8 HARV. WOMEN’S L.J. 155,
170 (1985) (describing the view of some African women that the term “mutilation” is offensive
and thus impedes positive dialogue); L. Amede Obiora, Bridges and Barricades: Rethinking
Polemics and Intransigence in the Campaign Against Female Circumcision, 47 CASE W. RES. L.
REV. 275, 289-90 (1997) (describing the debate over phraseology, noting the flaws in both
popular terms “circumcision” and “mutilation,” and arguing that she uses the term “circum-
cision” because “[t]he perception and meaning of the practices for the women who exist within
the domain they define are of utmost relevance for deliberating constructive nomenclature and
strategy”).
Largely in an effort to avoid this debate, some commentators have developed other
terms to describe the practice.  See, e.g., Gunning, supra passim (using the expression “female
genital surgery”); Obiora, supra, at 288 (using, on at least one occasion, the term “[g]enital
scarification and reconstruction”).  These terms have yet to catch on, perhaps because they are
problematic in their own way.  (For example, both appear to imply that the practice is some-
how medical in nature; given its traditional forms, however, these terms are euphemistic at
best.)  This Article will use both FGM and female circumcision, depending on the perspective
being discussed.
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popular press,18 the legal academy,19 and the political arena.20  Al-
though largely initiated by women from the mostly African and
Asian cultures that practice FGM,21 the public international discus-
18. While there has been much in the American press in the last few years on the topic of
FGM, A.M. Rosenthal in particular has written consistently on the subject.  See, e.g., A.M. Ro-
senthal, Editorial, Making the World a Better Place, SUN-SENTINEL (Ft. Lauderdale), June 2,
1996, at 5G (urging President and Hillary Clinton and Bob and Elizabeth Dole to use their po-
litical influence to achieve a ban on FGM); A.M. Rosenthal, Editorial, Female Mutilation No
Longer Tolerated, LEXINGTON HERALD-LEADER, Sept. 12, 1994, at A13 (noting significance of
international agreement at U.N. Conference in Cairo to include the following statement in the
Cairo declaration: “[g]overnments are urged to prohibit female genital mutilation wherever it
exists and to give vigorous support to efforts . . . to eliminate such practices”); A.M. Rosenthal,
Editorial, And the Torture Continues, BALTIMORE EVENING SUN, July 28, 1993, at 15A
(expressing “hope that [the practice of FGM in the U.S.] might arouse some interest among
Americans”); A.M. Rosenthal, Editorial, Torture Too Long Ignored: Female Genital Mutilation
Has Scores of Millions of Living Victims Around the World, DAYTON DAILY NEWS, Jan. 4,
1993, at 7A (noting, in his first column on FGM, that it was “the most widespread abuse of hu-
man rights and the human body in the world”); see also, e.g., Brune, supra note 1 (describing
the practical problem that is stopping FGM in the U.S. in the context of Harborview’s proposed
alternative to FGM); Celia W. Dugger, Clash of Cultures, Customs: Rite of Female Genital Cut-
ting Collides with U.S. Views, New Law, CHARLOTTE OBSERVER, Dec. 26, 1996, at 2A
(describing a Somali refugee’s insistence that his daughters be circumcised in the U.S. despite
the federal ban).
19. See, e.g., Gunning, supra note 17, at 197 (noting criticism that FGM is a practice which
imposes male authority upon women through control of their bodies and sexuality); Lewis, su-
pra note 17, at 3 (noting the tension concerning Western feminist discourse regarding their hu-
man rights-based, cross-cultural approach to stopping FGM); Obiora, supra note 17, at 377
(arguing that current attempts to eradicate FGM may fail because they do not take into ac-
count the cultural primacy of the practice).
20. FGM has been banned in France, England, Canada, and the United States, among
other countries.  See Breitung, supra note 17, at 664-77 (discussing current Western legal sanc-
tions against FGM).  In the United States, the practice has been the subject of both federal and
state legislation.  See, e.g., Federal Prohibition of Female Genital Mutilation Act, 18 U.S.C.A. §
116(a) (West Supp. 1997); CAL. PENAL CODE § 273.4 (West Supp. 1998); DEL. CODE ANN. tit.
11, § 780 (Supp. 1996); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 609.2245 (West 1998); N.D. CENT. CODE § 12.1-
36-10 (Supp. 1997); TENN. CODE ANN. § 39-13-110 (1997); WIS. STAT. ANN. § 146.35 (West
1997).  FGM has also been the subject of intense international political scrutiny, principally in
the course of international human rights discussions of “traditional practices” and women’s
rights. See, e.g., Boulware-Miller, supra note 17 passim (describing the international human
rights efforts to eradicate female circumcision); Katherine Brennan, The Influence of Cultural
Relativism on International Human Rights Law: Female Circumcision as a Case Study, 7 LAW &
INEQ. J. 367 (1989) (describing these same efforts); Breitung, supra note 17, at 677-84 (dis-
cussing efforts to treat FGM as a violation of the international human rights to health, freedom
from torture and degrading treatment, and generally the rights of women).
21. See Boulware-Miller, supra note 17, at 159-60 (describing efforts by African women to
eradicate female circumcision).  Most prominent in the discussion in the United States are Me-
serak “Mimi” Ramsey, who is originally from Ethiopia and who founded the anti-FGM organi-
zations Forward USA and Forward International, and Fauziya Kasinga, who is from Togo and
whose case set the precedent for FGM being a considered a legitimate basis for asylum.  See
COLEMAN 07/15/98  11:51 AM
1998] THE SEATTLE COMPROMISE 727
sion (at least that heard in the United States) often appears to be
dominated by Western feminists and rights advocates who view FGM
as a women’s rights issue, and who seek recognition of a universal
human right not to be genitally mutilated.22  To support their posi-
tion, they have introduced an international audience to the details of
the various forms of the practice, which range from simple “sunna”
circumcisions requiring “only” the partial or complete removal of the
clitoris to complete “Pharaonic infibulations” requiring removal of
all of a girl’s external genitalia followed by the stitching together of
the resulting wound.23  The drastic medical ramifications of these pro-
infra notes 114-15 (describing contributions of Mimi Ramsey); FAUZIYA KASSINDJA & LAYLI
MILLER BASHIR, DO THEY HEAR YOU WHEN YOU CRY (1998).
22. Alice Walker’s 1992 novel Possessing the Secret of Joy is largely credited with exposing
FGM to the American audience.  See generally ALICE WALKER, POSSESSING THE SECRET OF
JOY (1992) (portraying a fictionalized account of an African immigrant who went mad and died
after being forced to submit to FGM).  See also ALICE WALKER & PRATHIBA PARMAR,
WARRIOR MARKS: FEMALE GENITAL MUTILATION AND THE SEXUAL BLINDING OF WOMEN
253 (1993) (recounting the journeys and experiences of Walker and Parmar while making a
documentary film on female genital mutilation in Africa); Paul Giddings, Alice Walker’s Ap-
peal, ESSENCE, July 1992, at 59 (book review and interview); Nightline: The Disturbing Issue of
Female Genital Mutilation (ABC television broadcast, Sept. 20, 1993).  In the United States,
“interest in FG[M] is attributable in part to recent fictional and documentary work done by
Alice Walker and to several high-profile FG[M]-related refugee and asylum cases.”  Lewis,
supra note 17, at 4.  FGM also has “received much attention in the Western press and among
Western feminists since about 1979, largely as a result of the work of Fran Hosken.”  Rhoda
Howard, Women’s Rights in English-speaking Sub-Saharan Africa, in  HUMAN RIGHTS AND
DEVELOPMENT IN AFRICA 46, 66 (Claude E. Welch, Jr. & Ronald I. Meltzer eds., 1984); see
also Brennan, supra note 20, at 376 n.47 (noting Hosken’s contribution to the FGM debate).
Interestingly, this “discovery” by Westerners of FGM in Africa ignores the practice in
our own history, which, according to Professor Obiora, persisted in the United States until the
1950s, and also was based on a desire to impose “patriarchal control on female sexuality.”
Obiora, supra note 17, at 298-99.  Although the practice was never commonplace in American
culture, Obiora is correct that
[f]emale circumcision is not the African “anomaly” that critics would have one be-
lieve.  Practices of genital alteration have existed in recent times in Australia, Asia,
Latin America, America, and Europe.  In fact, Western surgeons claimed to have in-
vented clitoridectomy.  English gynecologist Isac Baker Brown, notable for his inno-
vative acumen, promoted excision in the early 1800s.  Although the practice was re-
pudiated by the British medical establishment in 1867, it persisted in the United
States through the 1950s.  Clitoridectomies are currently infrequent in the West, but
in rare instances they are inappropriately prescribed as treatment for sexual dysfunc-
tion. . . . [Circumcision] was also foisted as a “remedy” for female masturbation . . . .
Id. at 298; see also infra note 224 (discussing the history of FGM in the U.S.).
23. See Coleman, supra note 3, at 1111 n.91 (describing the practice of FGM).  A “sunna”
circumcision, also known as a clitoridectomy, “involves the removal of a part of the clitoris or
the whole organ.”  Id. (quoting Toubia, supra note 17, at 712).  Infibulation
involves the removal of the clitoris and the labia minora, plus incision of the labia
majora to create raw surfaces . . . that are stitched together to cover the urethra and
the entrance to the vagina with a hood of skin, leaving a very small posterior opening
for the passage of urine and menstrual blood.
COLEMAN 07/15/98  11:51 AM
728 DUKE LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 47:717
cedures—including bleeding, infection, and sometimes death—have
featured prominently in this discussion.24  In general, however, the fo-
cus of Western condemnation of FGM lies in its patriarchal under-
pinnings25 and in the fact that it deprives the girls and women in those
societies of what Western opponents call the “right to sexual and
corporal integrity.”26  Specifically, opponents of FGM have noted that
girls are subjected to this practice, inter alia, to prevent promiscuity
and to assure that they will remain chaste for their future husbands.27
Id. (quoting Toubia, supra note 17, at 712) (alteration in original).  Whatever the  case, “the
procedure . . . generally is performed without anesthetic by a layperson.”  Id. at 1111.  “Bleed-
ing from the raw surfaces and from the clitoral artery may be halted with a few stitches of cat-
gut or thorn or by the application of homemade poultices.”  Id. at 1111 n.91 (quoting Toubia,
supra note 17, at 712).
24. See, e.g., Coleman, supra note 3, at 1112 (discussing the common medical implications
of FGM).
25. See Gunning, supra note 17, at 197.
26. Boulware-Miller, supra note 17, at 169-72 (characterizing the sexual/corporal integrity
argument as one frequently raised by Western feminists).
27. See, e.g., Coleman, supra note 3, at 1112.  It also has been said that the procedure is
necessary based on the belief that if not cut off, “the clitoris . . . would continue growing, even-
tually reaching the knees.”  Jacquie Miller, Canadian Aid Helps Stop Ritual Genital Mutilation
of Girls in Rural Mali, OTTAWA CITIZEN, Jan. 22, 1997, at A5.  Professor Obiora condemns this
patriarchal focus, which she characterizes as an example of the Western emphasis on the nega-
tive aspects of the traditional practice.  See Obiora, supra note 17, at 300-07.  Specifically, she
notes that in addition to this patriarchal rationale for FGM, the rite also “serves the multiple
purpose of expressing, inculcating, and ensuring the maintenance of cultural values and iden-
tity.”  Id. at 295; see also Boulware-Miller, supra note 17, at 157-58 (describing the complex
social, economic, and cultural rationales for the traditional practice, including the belief that
circumcision is required to ensure suitability for marriage and thus to “avoid becoming social
and economic outcasts”).
Professor Obiora is correct that Western critics generally have focused on the patriarchal
and sexual issues surrounding FGM to the virtual exclusion of other issues, thus avoiding the
complexities inherent in the situation of African women and girls.  On the other hand, it is ap-
parent that the other, more positive rationales for the traditional practice are themselves tied to
or even stem from the patriarchal structure of the society, and the fact that this structure relies
at least in part on the physical and cultural domination of women.  Thus, the fact that female
circumcision is in some cultures a rite of passage and a prerequisite to marriage may simply be
a manifestation of the core principle that women are to be submissive and that rituals designed
to assure the perpetuation of that principle are to be encouraged.  This is not so foreign a no-
tion even for Western women, since, as Professor Obiora herself notes, we do not have to look
back so far in time within our own cultures to see very similar patterns, practices, and motiva-
tions.  See Obiora, supra note 17, at 298-99 (describing Western history of FGM); see also infra
note 224.
Whatever the case, it appears that this Western perspective is not particularly helpful,
because even, and perhaps especially, the African women who seek to eliminate the practice of
FGM resent it.  This point is made most persuasively by Kay Boulware-Miller.  See Boulware-
Miller, supra note 17, at 169-72 (noting how the Western feminists’ right-to-corporal-integrity
argument alienates African opponents of FGM because it ignores the socio-political context in
which the practice is performed).  Her informative and concise work describing, among other
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In the course of their challenge, opponents of FGM often have
sought to reject or marginalize the view that the practice is dictated
by religion,28 apparently believing that this makes their argument
more acceptable.
However, despite their obvious successes, opponents of FGM
have not offered viable solutions for two of the most important
problems inherent in the discussion.  First, they have failed to pro-
vide a blueprint that would eventually lead to the eradication of the
practice.  Second, opponents of FGM have failed adequately to meet
the more theoretical but equally thorny challenge from willing FGM
participants and cultural relativists who reject what they view as the
“imperialism” inherent in the perspectives of their Western critics.29
The first problem exists because FGM is ingrained in the cul-
tures of the people who engage in its practice and, despite the hearty
denials of its opponents, sometimes in their religions as well.  As a re-
sult, the promulgation or administration of criminal sanctions against
the practice by both Western countries that harbor immigrants from
things, the problems with the Western emphasis on sexuality and bodily integrity, should be
required reading for anyone in the West who is interested in the issue, or who works with af-
fected immigrant communities.
28. See, e.g., 140 CONG. REC. S14,242, S14,244-45 (daily ed. Oct. 5, 1994) (statement of
Sen. Moseley-Braun) (contrasting religious right to male circumcision with lack of religious
foundation for FGM).  Consistent with the approach of Senator Moseley-Braun, Patricia
Schroeder is said to have sought purposefully to minimize the significance of the religious issue
in the course of her successful effort to convince the House of Representatives to pass its fed-
eral proscription of FGM.  See Donna Abu-Nasr, Woman’s Efforts to Ban Genital Mutilation of
Girls Pays [sic] Off Today, SEATTLE TIMES, Mar. 29, 1997, at A3 see also infra notes 33-34 and
accompanying text (discussing the argument that FGM is not a religious requirement).
29. “Cultural relativism is a ‘doctrine that holds that (at least some) . . . variations [in
moral rules and social institutions] are exempt from legitimate criticism by outsiders.’”  Brei-
tung, supra note 17, at 684 (omissions and alterations in original) (quoting Jack Donnelly, Cul-
tural Relativism and Universal Human Rights, 6 HUM. RTS. Q. 400, 400 (1984)).  “[T]he rela-
tivist cannot disapprove of specific cultural practices . . . because the practices regarded as
reprehensible are judged according to an ethnocentric standard.”  Alison Dundes Renteln, The
Unanswered Challenge of Relativism and the Consequences for Human Rights, 7 HUM. RTS. Q.
514, 514 (1985); see also Gunning, supra note 17, at 190-91 (defining “cultural relativist” as one
who believes that “all cultures are fine on their own terms,” and that “universalism [is] barely
disguised ethnocentrism, a cultural imperialism”).  Gunning also describes the imperialism in-
herent in the “arrogant perception” of some Western critics of FGM.  See id. at 198-99.  I have
been charged with such imperialism (sometimes “neoimperialism”) for the views I expressed in
my article, Individualizing Justice Through Multiculturalism: The Liberals’ Dilemma, supra
note 3, which opposes use of a “cultural defense” to prosecutions of FGM as child abuse.  See
Volpp, supra note 10, at 1577, 1599, 1609.
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 these cultures30 and countries like Egypt31 that seek to encourage
their own cultures to evolve away from the practice, have done little
to prevent its performance. 32
The categorical view that FGM is not required by Islam has been
particularly pernicious.33  The fact is that despite the views of some
Islamic clerics who have stated that the traditional practice is cultur-
ally- rather than religiously-based,34 many Muslims continue fiercely
30. See supra note 20 (describing Western political efforts to eradicate FGM).
31. See BBC News, Egyptian Court Holds Up Ban On Female Genital Mutilation (visited
Dec.   28,   1997)      <http://news.bbc.oo.uk./hi/english/world/middle%5Feast/newsid%5F42000/
42986.stn>  (reporting that the highest administrative court in Egypt, the Council of State, up-
held an official ban on FGM).  The Council of State’s ruling overturned a lower court’s ruling
that the ban placed undue restrictions on physicians.  See Douglas Jehl, Egyptian Court Over-
turns Ban on Cutting of Girls’ Genitals, N.Y. TIMES, June 26, 1997, at A12.  The ban, instituted
by the government of President Hosni Mubarak in the wake of pressure from human rights ad-
vocates, prohibits “female genital cutting” by both non-medical and medical personnel.  See id.
The ban is aggressively opposed by some Islamic leaders who assert that the practice is re-
quired by Islam.  See id.  Hisham Mubarak, a human rights activist, described the conflict:
“There is a real crisis in Egyptian society; it is half-secular, half-religious . . . . The Government
has not decided what it wants to be.  Egyptian civil society is stuck between a rock and a hard
place, between the Government and the Islamists.”  Id.  Polls conducted in Egypt “have shown
that 70 to 90 percent of Egyptian women have been subjected to some form of genital cutting,
although for younger urban women the percentage is far less.”  Id.
32. Some have noted this failure in the U.S. federal proscription, saying that it is
more a political statement—that Americans disapprove of this procedure—than an
answer to the problem.  “If someone is performing (the operation) in this country[,]
they’re probably not terribly concerned about U.S. laws . . . . The community is going
to close off and protect the people who are performing it.  This is not something that
people are forced to do.  This is something that people want to do.”
Abu-Nasr, supra note 28 (quoting Dr. Michael Rich of Boston’s Children’s Hospital); see also
Boulware-Miller, supra note 17, at 158 (noting that “[w]hile legislation should not be disre-
garded as a possible means to eradicate the practice, successful efforts to reduce the incidence
of female circumcision will likely come from community-based health and educational pro-
grams rather than from penal sanctions”).
33. See, e.g., TiaJuana Jones-Bibbs, Note, United States Follows Canadian Lead and Takes
an Unequivocal Position Against Female Genital Mutilation: In Re Fauziya Kasinga, 4 TULSA J.
COMP. & INT’L L. 275, 278-79 (1997) (“Pro-FGM scholars attempt to justify their position by
noting the alleged [religious] history of FGM . . . [however] FGM is a matter of tradition and
not religion.”); Kris Ann Balser Moussette, Note, Female Genital Mutilation and Refugee Status
in the United States—A Step in the Right Direction, 19 B.C. INT’L & COMP. L. REV. 353, 362
(1996) (“Adherence to religion is also a popular justification for FGM, but neither Christian
nor Islamic dogma requires such mutilation”); Mary M. Sheridan, Comment, In Re Fauziya
Kasinga: The United States Has Opened Its Doors to Victims of Female Genital Mutilation, 71
ST. JOHN’S L. REV. 433, 439 (1997) (“The rationale that FGM is based on religious beliefs is
misguided.”).
34. See Layli Miller Bashir, Female Genital Mutilation in the United States: An Examina-
tion of Criminal and Asylum Law, 4 AM. U. J. GENDER & L. 415, 424-25 (1996):
The religious reasons cited for perpetuating FGM are unpersuasive because
the practice is not explicitly mandated by either Islam or Christianity, the two pre-
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to debate whether FGM is required by Islam.35 A thorough examina-
tion of this debate is beyond the scope of this Article.  However, to
appreciate the commitment certain immigrants have to female cir-
cumcision, and also to determine the constitutional weight to be ac-
corded that practice, it is important to understand at least in a gen-
eral way the basis for the traditional view of some Muslims that it is
religiously-based.
There are two sources of Islamic law, the Koran and the Sunna.
The Koran is the principal source of authority in Islam because it
contains God’s own proclamations to the Prophet Mohammed.36  For
the definitive interpretation of the Koran, Muslims turn to the Sunna,
a compendium of the Prophet’s sayings and customs.37  Individual
sayings or customs of the Prophet are called hadith.38
The Koran does not mention female (or male) circumcision.39
However, this omission is not unusual in and of itself, as that text
does not address many specific subjects of importance to the relig-
ion.40  On the other hand, the subject of female circumcision does ap-
pear in the Sunna, where, according to Professor Annemarie Schim-
mel, a “barely known” hadith addresses the practice directly.41  It is
apparently from the Sunna that many Muslims derive their view that
female circumcision is mandated by Islam:42 If a practice was done in
dominant religions of the countries where FGM is practiced . . . Islam is the religion
most associated with the regions where FGM is performed and its leadership has, on
multiple occasions, refuted the notion that FGM is mandated by Muslim precepts.
35. See supra note 31 (describing this debate in Egypt); see also Sami A. Aldeeb Abu-
Sahlieh, To Mutilate in the Name of Jehovah or Allah: Legitimization of Male and Female Cir-
cumcision (visited Nov. 7, 1996) <http://www.hollyfeld.org/~xastur/mutilate.html> (setting out
disagreement among Muslim scholars concerning religious basis for female circumcision, and
arguing that it is not a requirement of Islam).
36. See ANNEMARIE SCHIMMEL, ISLAM 29 (1992).
37. See id. at 51-52.
38. See id. There are approximately three thousand recognized hadith. See id.
39. See SCHIMMEL, supra note 36, at 54-55; Abu-Sahlieh, supra note 35, at n.13 and ac-
companying text.
40. See SCHIMMEL, supra note 36, at 51.
41. Id. at 55; Abu-Sahlieh, supra note 35, at nn.41-42. For example, the Sunna describes
Mohammed explaining to a female circumcisor that excision “is allowed” and as instructing the
circumcisor “if you do cut, do not overdo it . . . because it brings more radiance to the face . . .
and is . . . better for the husband.” Abu-Sahlieh, supra note 35, at n.41 (parenthetical omitted).
Mohammed also is said to have stated that “[c]ircumcision is a sunnah for the men [i.e., con-
forms to the tradition of Mohammad] and makrumah [an honorable deed] for the women.”  Id.
42. See SCHIMMEL, supra note 36, at 55 (noting that a number of Muslim communities en-
gage in the practice); see also infra notes 92-95 and accompanying text (describing view of some
Somali immigrants that the practice is required by Islam because it is mentioned in a hadith,
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the time of Mohammed, and especially if Mohammed sanctioned it, it
is considered a requirement of the religion. The religious status of
female circumcision  is contested despite its existence in a confirming
hadith because the relevant authority is obscure, and also because not
all hadith are considered reliable.43
In any event, many Muslims who believe that female circumci-
sion is required by Islam are not personally familiar with the religious
texts or the substance of the hadith in question.44  These Muslims par-
ticularly appear to derive their belief that the practice is religiously-
mandated from the overriding principle of Islam—which itself means
“complete surrender to the Divine will”45—that the religion governs
all of their lives’ activities, and from the specific statements of their
clerics.46
Although this view of religion as encompassing all facets of life
may be foreign to some who are not Muslim, it is perfectly consistent
with Islam.47  Islamic law, for example, “is a way of life that governs
morals, religious practice, and the resolution of civil, criminal and
family matters.”48  The Koran itself “contain[s] solutions for all
problems that arise in the world”49 including “quite a number of
regulations for worldly affairs, daily life, and political order.”50  While
and noting that consistent with this hadith, the traditional form of female circumcision practiced
in Somalia is called sunna, or “in the tradition of Mohammed”).
43. See SCHIMMEL, supra note 36, at 52-53 (discussing “sound” and “less ‘sound’” hadith
generally); Abu-Sahlieh, supra note 35, at nn.43-45 (arguing that the hadith on which female
circumcision is based is suspect).  It is important to understand that the scholarly study of the
sunna is in fact primarily a study of the reliability of individual hadith, and involves in each in-
stance a search for the genealogy or provenance of the hadith to determine to the extent possi-
ble whether or not it actually comes from Mohammed himself.  See Schimmel, supra note 36, at
52-53.  As a result of these searches, “each hadith consists of the text . . . and the . . . chain of
those who have heard the text in question.”  Id. at 52. To be considered authoritative, “[t]his
chain has to continue without interruption to Muhammad or one of his companions.”  Id.
44. In part this is because the texts are in Arabic, and thus they are both translated and
interpreted for most Muslims by their own clerics.
45. Id. at 14.
46. See, e.g., supra note 31 (describing clerical source of some Egyptian Muslims’ belief
that female circumcision is a requirement of Islam); see also infra note 98 and accompanying
text (quoting Somali immigrant as saying that “[e]verything we do comes from religion—how
we eat, how we dress, how we talk to people”).
47. See SCHIMMEL, supra note 36, at 17 (describing Islam as teaching that “[a]ll of life was
and is permeated by religion”).
48. Jill Schachner Chanen, Beheading and Blood Money, A.B.A. J., Jan. 1998, at 34.
49. SCHIMMEL, supra note 36, at 30.
50. Id. at 33; see also infra notes 92-99 (describing this broad basis for the view of some
Somali immigrants that female circumcision is required by Islam).  Of course, it is also this gen-
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this premise is less specific than that which is based directly in the
relevant hadith, because it is the bedrock of Islam it nevertheless con-
stitutes a basis for believing, as many Muslims clearly do, that their
religion requires them to circumcise their daughters.51
Ultimately, belief is the critical ingredient for constitutional pur-
poses: First Amendment doctrine requires that those seeking its pro-
tection demonstrate a sincere personal belief that a traditional prac-
tice is religiously-mandated.52  Significantly, this First Amendment
test does not require that the belief comply with standard religious
“dogma.”53  Thus, even if mainstream Islamic scholars ultimately de-
termine that female circumcision is not a requirement of Islam, the
right of sincere dissenters to the protections of the First Amendment
would not be affected.54
The failure of mostly Western opponents of FGM to recognize
the almost-impermeable impasse that is created by the religious be-
liefs of some Muslims is not the only stumbling block these oppo-
nents face in their efforts to eradicate FGM.  The second, more theo-
retical problem, concerns the criticism raised by cultural relativists
that Western interference is inappropriate because it is based in
“imperialistic” tendencies.  Professor Isabelle Gunning makes this
point eloquently.  She agrees that what she calls “female genital sur-
geries” ought to be eradicated, but notes that the lack of respect in-
herent in the West’s incredulous and categorical condemnation of the
practice has contributed to a backlash within the cultural and relig-
ious communities that embrace it.55  A particular sore point has been
eral foundation that creates the potential for the argument that the practice of female circumci-
sion is culturally- rather than religiously-based.
51. See infra notes 92-99 and accompanying text.
52. See Frazee v. Illinois Dep’t of Employment Sec., 489 U.S. 829, 834 (1989) (holding that
the Free Exercise Clause protects individuals with sincerely held religious beliefs even when
those beliefs do not arise out of the commands of an established religious sect); Thomas v. Re-
view Bd., 450 U.S. 707, 713-14 (1981) (stating that individual religious beliefs “need not be ac-
ceptable, logical, consistent, or comprehensible to others in order to merit First Amendment
protection”).
53. See ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: PRINCIPLES AND POLICIES 970
(1997).
54. As a result, Muslims who believe that female circumcision is required by their relig-
ion—even if they are in the minority—could argue that they should be protected under this
doctrine.  This argument likely would be overcome in cases where parents proposed to perform
traditional circumcisions because the government has a compelling interest in protecting chil-
dren from physical abuse.  On the other hand, it is likely that no such compelling interest would
exist if parents proposed to perform the sort of symbolic circumcision described in this Article.
55. See Gunning, supra note 17, at 198-200 (describing her own aversion to the practice,
and noting that the “arrogant perception” of outsiders had alienated those within the affected
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the emphasis Western feminists have placed on the argument that
FGM deprives girls and women of “sexual and corporal integrity”
because that focus ignores the “complex sociopolitical context” in
cultures who would be natural allies) (citing Marilyn Frye, In and Out of Harm’s Way, in THE
POLITICS OF REALITY: ESSAYS IN FEMINIST THEORY 52, 69 (1983)).  Professor Gunning’s arti-
cle negotiates the divide between ethnocentrism (“arrogant perception”) and cultural relativ-
ism (“independence”), noting the problems inherent in both perspectives, and suggesting that
the solution to cultural collisions like “female genital surgery” lies in a recognition by multicul-
tural feminists of their “interconnectedness.”  See id. at 202-47.  Her work is exceptional in this
regard, as it is one of only a few contributions to the growing literature on the subject of FGM
that offers a paradigm to reconcile the two traditional opponents of FGM—cultural relativists
who would eradicate female circumcision and Western critics of the traditional practice.
The only apparent difficulty with this attack on the imperialism of Western critics is that
it appears to equate in all instances ethnocentrism with arrogant perception.  Although Profes-
sor Gunning herself does not make this equation explicit—and thus she may not intend it—the
implication is certainly inherent in the concept of arrogant perception and in related literature
generally.  The arrogant perceiver is described in Gunning’s article as seeing the “other” as
having “no independent perceptions and interest but only those that [the arrogant perceiver]
impose[s].”  Id. at 199.  Gunning also describes the Western critic as viewing “[a]ny evidence
that the ‘other’ is organized around her own interests [as] evidence of defectiveness in the
‘other.’” Id. (citing Frye, supra, at 69).  She argues that in international matters, and perhaps
also when confronted with domestic cultural collisions, the ethnocentrist sees the West as
“good and enlightened,” and the rest of the world as “ignorant and barbaric.”  Id.  While it is
beyond dispute that there are and always have been racist ethnocentrists who are on a mission
to save “the ignorant savage,” there also are ethnocentrists who are not racist.
Ethnocentrists who are not racist seek change because they believe their view is “better”
or “the best” for reasons that have nothing to do with race or ethnicity.  These ethnocentrists
do not believe that “others” are “barbarians.”  For example, one can take the position of this
Article, that FGM is wrong, without also believing that those who engage in the traditional
practice lack “independent perceptions and interest,” are somehow “defective,” “ignorant,” or
are otherwise “victims” in need of rescue by so-called “enlightened” Western white women.
Indeed, what has appropriately been described as the “complex socio-economic environment”
in which women in Africa live and make decisions makes this characterization wholly illegiti-
mate.  See infra note 56 and accompanying text.  Similarly, given that cultural context, the deci-
sion whether or not to circumcise cannot easily be reduced to a “sexual integrity” or “child
abuse” issue.  See infra note 56 and accompanying text.  At the same time, however, recogniz-
ing or being sensitive to these facts does not mean that FGM is “the right thing to do.”  And it
certainly does not signify that it is morally inappropriate to argue for its eradication in the do-
mestic (American) context, where the practice can easily be characterized as child abuse and
gender discrimination, based on the dispositive fact that women’s socio-economic opportunities
are entirely different in this country.  To the contrary, given these different conditions, it is en-
tirely appropriate to say that the anti-FGM perspective is the “better” one—not more enlight-
ened, just better.
Relatedly, this position—particularly as applied to the practice of FGM in the West—
and the role of Western feminists at least in the domestic discourse is entirely appropriate be-
cause these feminists are not and cannot be “imperialists” in their own country.  The United
States has a culture, just as do those countries where FGM is practiced indigenously.  It is sim-
ply inaccurate to describe those who subscribe to American cultural tenets as “imperialists” or
even as ethnocentrists when they seek to adhere to or to apply those tenets within the domestic
context.
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which the practice occurs.56  What is ultimately significant for pur-
poses of this Article, however, is that this relativist backlash has been
based at least in part on the argument that Western concern is hypo-
critical because its cultures engage in what practitioners of FGM and
cultural relativists see as the largely equivalent practice of male cir-
cumcision.57  If you so willingly circumcise your boys, ask practitio-
56. See Boulware-Miller, supra note 17, at 171 (describing the argument of and the back-
lash against Western feminists even by women in the affected cultures who otherwise oppose
female circumcision).
This emphasis on sexual deprivation is seen as particularly myopic by African women,
for example, who view the issue of female circumcision in a larger “socio-political context” that
includes sex as well as social and economic success.  See id. at 170-71; see also id. at 165-69
(describing how the characterization of female circumcision as child abuse also ignores this
wider context).  Commentators setting out the African perspective have described African
women as undertaking a balancing process where sexual integrity ultimately is judged to be less
valuable than other social and economic benefits.  See id. at 165-71 (making this point in the
context of child abuse perspective on female circumcision).  The fact that this consideration of
the larger social context and resultant balancing takes place is said to highlight the
“imperialism” and “arrogance” (some might even say ignorance) of the Western perception
that “almost every woman on the planet [would be] horrified by [female circumcision] if they
ha[d] time to think about it.”  Abu-Nasr, supra note 28 (attributing the quote to Patricia Schro-
eder).  As a result, African opponents of FGM prefer an African solution to the problem, one
which does not focus on “women’s sexual integrity.”  Boulware-Miller, supra note 17, at 175.
Interestingly, a contextual approach was adopted by the Special Working Group on Tra-
ditional Practices, a section of the United Nations’ Sub-Commission for the Prevention of Dis-
crimination and the Protection of Minorities, which itself was established, inter alia, to study
how best to deal with the issue of female circumcision in the context of these relativist critiques.
See Breitung, supra note 17, at 689-90.  Its first report, issued in 1986, emphasized cultural con-
text but chose to “appl[y] a balancing process weighing the procedure’s health consequences
against its cultural functions.  The Working Group found that female circumcision, judged in its
own context, had become increasingly obsolete due to social and economic changes in the prac-
ticing societies.”  Id.  This fact of “social and economic change” is particularly pronounced in
the case of immigrants to Western countries.  See supra note 55 (discussing difference between
African and Western contexts in which choice to circumcise is made).
57. See, e.g., Obiora, supra note 17, at 319-20 (describing this alleged hypocrisy).  Profes-
sor Obiora argues that while infibulation and clitoridectomy are not analogous to male circum-
cision anatomically, the traditional sunna, where only the hood or prepuce (foreskin) of the
clitoris is removed, is directly analogous.  See id. at 289.  Since the sunna may serve the purpose
of cleanliness and hygiene, an accepted rationale for male circumcision, Obiora concludes that
“medicalization” of the female procedure should satisfy those who honestly address its demer-
its, and ensure equal protection guarantees for parents of girls who wish them circumcised un-
der these constraints.  See id. passim.  Although this position goes a long way toward recogniz-
ing the valid arguments and concerns of both sides of the dispute, it is quite unlikely that this
particular physical equation, even with the protections afforded by medicalization of the female
procedure, makes male and female circumcision the same thing, particularly for equal protec-
tion purposes.  For example, this argument ignores the very real potential for vastly different
emotional damage to boys and girls, and for vastly different physical ramifications.  In any
event, Professor Obiora’s very provocative argument, and responses to it, are thoroughly set
forth in Colloquium, Bridging Society, Culture, and Law: The Issue of Female Circumcision, 47
CASE W. RES. L. REV. 263 (1997).
COLEMAN 07/15/98  11:51 AM
736 DUKE LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 47:717
ners of female circumcision, how can you condemn us for doing the
same to our girls?
This analogy can and has been rejected as specious and disin-
genuous, as the traditional forms of FGM are as different from male
circumcision in terms of procedure, physical ramifications, and moti-
vation as ear piercing is to a penilectomy.58  Nevertheless, the attempt
to analogize the two has been provocative, and has succeeded to
some extent in causing opponents of FGM to question the propriety
of Western action against the practice.59
It is against this backdrop that the ultimately inconsequent but
nevertheless laudatory efforts of one hospital in Seattle must be
viewed.  That hospital, Harborview Medical Center, confronted per-
haps for the first time in the United States60 not only the practical
problem of how to stop FGM in its community, but also the usually
disingenuous, but in this case ultimately legitimate, comparison be-
tween FGM and male circumcision.61  Harborview did not categori-
cally reject the repeated requests of the immigrant mothers who
asked to have both their girls and boys circumcised.62  Instead, it lis-
58. See infra notes 184-204 and accompanying text (discussing the differences, both physi-
cal or medical and motivational, between FGM and male circumcision).
59. For example, “[o]fficials at three private Atlanta [immigrant and refugee] resettlement
agencies said they avoid the controversial topic in their refugee orientation programs” because
they were reluctant to condemn the immigrants’ traditional practices.  See Jane Hansen &
Deborah Scroggins, Female Circumcision: U.S., Georgia Forced to Face Medical, Legal Issues,
ATLANTA J. & CONST., Nov. 15, 1992, at A1; see also Gunning, supra note 17, at 190-91
(wrestling with the dilemma caused by multicultural feminism).
60. See Brune, supra note 1 (arguing that “[t]hough this is an issue physicians and hospitals
across the country likely are facing, Harborview is the only one to discuss the problem openly
as a public health issue”); Tina Kelley, Token “Circumcision” is Too Painful; Ritual: Seattle
Doctors Hoped Their Procedure Would Spare Young Women from Returning to Africa for Fe-
male Circumcision. But Even Their Symbolic Alternative Provoked a Public Outcry, BAL-
TIMORE MORNING SUN, Jan. 6, 1997, at 2A (reporting that “Harborview is the only medical
center in the United States to address the issue”); see also Obiora, supra note 17, at 284-85
(describing efforts by Dutch government to implement a similar proposal).
61. See Obiora, supra note 17, at 284-85 (describing this same effort).
62. While FGM is said to be intended in large part to control the sexuality of girls for the
present and future benefit or pleasure of men, it is generally performed by the women in the
community, with the mothers and grandmothers of the female children orchestrating the pro-
cedure.  See infra Part II (describing involvement of women in procedure and decision making).
Indeed, in the traditional Somali culture and religion at issue in the Harborview context, men
apparently are excluded from participating in the traditional practice.  See id.  The irony in this
arrangement is extraordinary, for not only is the ritual patriarchal in nature, but the culture has
evolved the added bonus for men that they do not even have to think about the pain and suf-
fering that is being inflicted on their girls.  But see supra note 27 (discussing whether the charac-
terization of FGM as a patriarchal practice is valid).  The fact that in some communities the
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tened to the women, heard them say that the circumcisions would
take place with or without the doctors’ participation, and worked out
a compromise with the immigrants: the hospital would perform a
“simple, symbolic cut”63 amounting to a mere “nick”—enough to
draw blood,64 with no tissue removal or subsequent scarring.65  Al-
though this procedure was clearly not the sort of procedure typically
thought of as FGM, it would have satisfied at least some of the mem-
bers of the immigrant community who required a form of female cir-
cumcision for their girls.  Moreover, in technical or clinical terms, the
suggested procedure was not even a circumcision,66 which itself en-
sured that what would have been done to girls was much less drastic
than what routinely is done to boys in that hospital, and in hospitals
across the country.  Ultimately, despite this unprecedented effort at
compromise, the procedure was never performed because some
prominent opponents of FGM, who generally take a categorical posi-
tion against any form of the traditional practice, launched a success-
ful campaign against the hospital’s efforts.67
In their Pyrrhic victory, however, Harborview’s opponents
probably denied some Somali girls in Seattle the possibility of living a
life free of the physical and emotional devastation caused by the tra-
ditional circumcision practiced in their community; in the name of
ideological purity, they probably sacrificed some of the very girls they
procedure also is said to provide a bonding experience for the girls and women merely in-
creases this irony:
The mothers do it to their daughters.  Like footbinding, like suttee or widow
burning, like mothers in America telling daughters to be a certain thing, to be like
this, and not like that.  The mothers always do it to their daughters—the men’s cul-
ture relies on this complicity for this is the role of the vanquished to be intimately in-
volved in their own oppression and to perpetuate it, . . . leaving the culture intact, the
culture of men.
Boulware-Miller, supra note 17, at 158 n.21 (quoting Conklin, Women’s Culture: Whose Cul-
ture?, in FRAN HOSKEN, FEMALE SEXUAL MUTILATIONS: THE FACTS AND PROPOSALS FOR
ACTION 20 (1980)).
63. Brune, supra note 1.
64. Telephone Interview with Dr. Leslie Miller, obstetrician/gynecologist at Harborview
Medical Center (June 6, 1997).
65. See infra notes 108-12 (discussing facts surrounding the Harborview proposal).
66. By definition, both formal and popular, a “circumcision” involves the removal or exci-
sion of tissue.  For example, male circumcision involves the removal of a boy’s prepuce or fore-
skin. See WEBSTER’S ENCYCLOPEDIC UNABRIDGED DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH
LANGUAGE 268 (1989).  Traditional forms of female circumcision at the very least involve the
removal of part of the clitoris.  See supra note 17 (comparing the mildest form of FGM to a
penilectomy).
67. See infra notes 113-35 and accompanying text (discussing opposition to Harborview
proposal).
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claim are the beneficiaries of their efforts.  As I will demonstrate, this
likelihood exists because the practice is thoroughly engrained in the
religion and culture of the Somalis seeking the compromise; the fact
that the parents were willing to accept a compromise as part of the
process of assimilation was not an indication that they were willing to
forego their tradition entirely.68
Additionally, Harborview’s opponents also squelched what was
perhaps the most successful compromise of a cultural collision that
has been publicly contemplated in this country. In that process, they
inadvertently began a public debate about the legitimacy of the com-
parison between some forms of female circumcision and traditional
male circumcision, and relatedly, about the legitimacy of the position
of cultural relativists and Harborview that the comparison is at least
sometimes a valid one.69  Although the substantial arguments that
both female and male circumcision should be considered child abuse
suggest that this debate is not one we should continue to avoid,70 it is
certainly not one which opponents of FGM willingly encounter.71
II.  THE HARBORVIEW PROPOSAL
The Harborview Medical Center in Seattle, Washington serves a
largely immigrant community, including a substantial number of So-
mali immigrants and refugees.72  In this capacity, it has had extensive
experience addressing the many differences between the cultural
68. See infra notes 85-99 and accompanying text (describing the immigrants’ cultural and
religious commitment to the practice).
69. See, e.g., Rachel Chauvin, Letter to the Editor, Female Circumcision—Isn’t It Equally
Inappropriate to Subject Boys to Procedure?, SEATTLE TIMES, Dec. 23, 1996, at B5 (arguing
that “I seem to be among the few who see the hypocrisy in our community’s outrage at the
thought of circumcising girls while allowing the same practice to occur with boys without even
mention of religious, cultural, or even medical justification”); Paul Ketteridge, Letter to the
Editor, Cultural Beliefs—Harborview Decision Demands Editorial Page Challenge, SEATTLE
TIMES, Dec. 16, 1996, at B5 (reporting that “Harborview has decided it will refuse to . . . per-
form female circumcisions . . . . One can only hope that our enlightened insurance commis-
sioner will end this discriminatory practice and mandate that all health-insurance carriers [that
cover male circumcision] cover this ancient practice immediately”).
70. See infra note 185 (describing the argument that male circumcision should be consid-
ered child abuse).
71. See supra note 28 (discussing how careful opponents of FGM have been to distinguish
that practice from male circumcision); infra note 272 (describing Schroeder’s efforts in this re-
gard).
72. There are approximately 3,500 Somali immigrants in the Seattle area.  Some are es-
tablished immigrants, and others are refugees of the recent war in that country.  See Brune, su-
pra note 1.
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practices of immigrants and American health care standards, which
incorporate, to a large extent, American culture.  The hospital’s pol-
icy is to be sensitive to these cultural differences and to assure that
the community it serves will trust in the good intentions of its doc-
tors.73  In the case of FGM, the hospital’s policy was challenged by a
Somali tradition that requires the circumcision of both boys and girls,
a tradition which clearly collided with the American custom and
health care practice of circumcising only boys.
While female circumcision is generally treated discreetly by So-
mali immigrants living in Western countries,74 in this instance, the
practice was squarely faced when pregnant Somali women, a majority
of whom apparently were recent refugees,75 answered this routine
hospital inquiry: “If it’s a boy, do you want him circumcised?” “Yes,”
replied some of the women, “and also if it’s a girl.”76  According to
one reporter, the women “repeatedly asked that their daughters be
cut.”77  Moreover, perhaps aware of the hospital’s reluctance to per-
form the procedure, the women also requested that instead of the
traditional cut, the doctors perform a symbolic sunna that would have
involved only a small incision or “nick” on the foreskin or prepuce
(also called the hood) of the clitoris, just enough to draw blood.78
73. See Carol M. Ostrom, Is Form of Circumcision Outlawed? Procedure at Harborview
Under Review, SEATTLE TIMES, Oct. 14, 1996, at B3 (quoting Dr. Abraham Bergman, Chief of
Pediatrics at Harborview Medical Center).
74. See EFUA DORKENOO, CUTTING THE ROSE: FEMALE GENITAL MUTILATION 127
(1994) (noting that an aura of secrecy has surrounded the practice of FGM by immigrants in
Western countries).
75. See Brune, supra note 1.
76. Id.
77. Dugger, supra note 18.
78. Telephone Interview with Dr. Leslie Miller, supra note 64.  That the suggestion for the
compromise circumcision came from the immigrant community is not as surprising as it may
seem to some.  For example, Professor Obiora notes that symbolic circumcision has been part
of the anti-circumcision campaign in Africa, where the practice, “[i]n moderate forms, [now
involves] only a drop of blood or the [removal of the] prepuce . . . from the clitoris.”  Obiora,
supra note 17, at 284.  She notes in particular that in Somalia, where the practice has been to a
large extent “sanitized”—the procedure is performed in hospitals or by trained medical per-
sonnel—“the sunna countenanced consists of a mere prick of the clitoris to shed a drop of
blood.”  Id. at 370.
This history and experience may explain why the Somali parents in Seattle were appar-
ently willing to consider the symbolic compromise despite their clear cultural and religious be-
liefs concerning the necessity of the practice to assure control over their girls.  See infra notes
85-99 and accompanying text (describing cultural and religious commitment Somali parents in
this case had to some version of the procedure).  It also may be that the parents, having moved
to the United States and gained an awareness of this country’s social and legal condemnation of
the traditional practice, were personally inclined not to circumcise their girls, but felt that they
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The hospital initially declined the request, telling the women
that in this country only boys are circumcised.79  In response, the
women told the hospital that if it did not perform the procedure, they
would have to send their daughters home to Somalia, or to one of
three Somali midwives in the Seattle area, each of whom had her own
idea of what a sunna requires.80
Although the hospital will not reveal the details of its discussions
with the Somali refugees, Somali men and women interviewed by the
Seattle Times confirmed “that if they could not get it done in the U.S.,
they would pay the $1,500 fare to fly their daughters to their home-
land, where [their daughters would] face the extreme version of the
cutting ritual.”81  The refugee mothers explained that if this were to
happen, it was possible that their daughters would suffer the same
drastic procedure to which they had been subjected.82  Specifically, as
one woman is reported to have said, “if mothers take their daughters
back to Africa, there is more chance that a grandmother who believes
had to engage in some symbolic practice to appease their more traditional relatives.  Whether
such motivation would satisfy a court examining a request under the First Amendment for a
religious exception to the ban on FGM is an open question.  If male circumcision is ever con-
sidered child abuse with a religious exception, the ability of non-practicing Jews who wished to
circumcise their boys also to appease their more traditional relatives would similarly be an
open question.
Professor Obiora also notes that “efforts[, like those of the Somalis here, previously]
have been made in Egypt and Sudan to officially recognize these attenuated forms of the prac-
tice” and that “[i]n the Netherlands, a Welfare, Health and Culture Ministry report recom-
mended a comparable accommodation.”  Obiora, supra note 17, at 284-85.  Interestingly, this
recommendation came in the wake of a series of harmful circumcisions in that country by So-
mali refugees who “could not afford the cultural alienation of not being circumcised” and were
“denied . . . assistance” by the Dutch medical community.  Id. at 285.  Ultimately, as in the case
of Harborview’s proposal, the Dutch proposal “drew a storm of protests and was eventually
superseded.”  Id.
79. Telephone Interview with Dr. Leslie Miller, supra note 64.
80. See id.  The Somali women told Dr. Miller that the sunna likely to be performed by the
midwives can range from the symbolic cut proposed by the immigrant women to the Hospital,
to the complete removal of the clitoris.  See id.  This description is consistent with what is gen-
erally known about sunna circumcisions, namely that they can range from a limited cutting of
the skin to removal of the clitoris and the labia minora.  Abu-Sahlieh, supra note 35.
81. Brune, supra note 1; see also Carol M. Ostrom, Harborview Debates Issue of Circumci-
sion of Muslim Girls, SEATTLE TIMES, Sept. 13, 1996, at A1 (quoting Somali refugee woman as
saying that “[i]t’s important enough to take your three kids and get a ticket [to Somalia], $1,500
for each person”).  This is apparently a typical response given by Somali immigrants to the
American proscription of FGM.  For example, a Somali refugee living in Houston told Celia
Dugger of the New York Times that “he would, if necessary, take his 17-month-old daughter
Ikram out of the country when the time comes in six or seven years.  His elder daughter, 11-
year-old Faduma, was initiated before the family fled Somalia.”  Dugger, supra note 18.
82. See Ostrom, supra note 81.
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in the old way, the Pharaonic circumcision, will call the shots.”83  A
Pharaonic circumcision—also called an infibulation—involves the
complete removal of the clitoris and labia, and sometimes the sewing
together of the remaining flesh, with only a small opening through
which urine and menstrual blood can pass.84
The immigrants also were candid about their commitment to
practice some version of the procedure despite the law.85  In their
view, the procedure is necessary, both as a cultural matter to assure
that the girls remained chaste, and as a religious matter because the
oral teachings of their clerics require it.
The cultural rationale was most easily and frequently articulated.
For example, one writer reported that “Somali men and women told
the Seattle Times their daughters would be shamed, dishonored and
unmarriageable if they were not cut, an act they believe shows their
purity.”86  And a Somali refugee couple living in Houston who al-
ready have had one daughter circumcised and who intend to do the
same with their other daughter explained, “We were taught that this
was a way of ensuring a girl’s good behavior . . . . It prevents them
from running wild.  Women should be meek, simple and quiet, not
aggressive and outgoing.  This is something we just accept.”87  In what
83. Id.  While it is possible that the immigrants questioned and quoted were posturing, and
would not so easily have paid such vast sums to send their daughters back to Somalia for the
procedure, there is also substantial evidence that immigrants are so committed to the practice
that they will take these drastic measures.  See Hansen & Scroggins, supra note 66 (describing
this commitment and the continued practice of FGM in the United States).  Articles docu-
menting the special concern that immigrants engage in the practice in the United States and
other similar evidence of this fact largely prompted the federal action that resulted in the Fed-
eral Prohibition of Female Genital Mutilation Act of 1997.  See infra note 150 and accompa-
nying text (describing the statutory ban).  For example,
[i]t is estimated that at least 7,000 women and girls immigrate to the United States
each year from countries where at least a majority of females, if not all of them, are
circumcised.  Most of these new immigrants live in California, New York, and the
Washington, D.C., area. . . . Even if only a small percentage of newly arrived families
from . . . countries [where girls are circumcised] maintain the tradition . . . [available]
figures suggest that hundreds of young girls either brought here or born here are in
danger each year.
Linda Burstyn, Female Circumcision Comes to America, ATLANTIC MONTHLY, Oct. 1995, at
28, 33.  Burstyn’s article also describes the work (sometimes unsuccessful) of refugee counsel-
ors who seek, in individual cases here in the United States, to convince parents not to have
their daughters circumcised.  See id. passim.
84. See supra note 23 and accompanying text (describing infibulations).
85. It was generally understood by the immigrant community that their traditional practice
is considered illegal in the United States.  See supra note 79 and infra notes 100-02 and accom-
panying text.
86. Brune, supra note 1.
87. Dugger, supra note 18.
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is perhaps the ultimate irony, this immigrant couple and other practi-
tioners of female circumcision see American culture as particularly
problematic for their families, as, in their view, “American women
jump from man to man because their sexual organs are driving them
to have sex.”88  A Somali woman in Seattle explained this perception
further, saying that the cutting was necessary to “help her daughters
avoid what she sees as the American disease: ‘Girls 13, 14, 15 get
pregnant, go wild, get welfare.’”89
As previously discussed in Part I, the religious rationale appears
to be somewhat more complicated because the question whether Is-
lam requires female circumcision is the subject of debate within the
Muslim community itself.90  This debate occurred even within Seat-
tle’s relatively small Islamic community.  For example, one commu-
nity activist noted that female circumcision “‘is not something advo-
cated in the Islamic religion. . . . Most Somalis now recognize it is as
physically destructive to women.’”91  Nevertheless, as one reporter
covering the story noted, “[a]lthough some Islamic scholars say the
procedure is not a religious requirement, some Muslim families from
Somalia insist that their faith requires it, much as the Jewish faith
does male circumcision.”92  As is the case with many Muslims, the
Somalis at issue believe that because the practice “is mentioned in
the Hadith,”93 it was required by Mohammed.94  That sunna—“in the
tradition of Mohammed”—is the name given to the most common
88. Abu-Nasr, supra note 28 (quoting Mimi Ramsey, President and Founder of Forward,
an organization combating FGM domestically and internationally).
89. Ostrom, supra note 81.
90. Compare Tom Paulson, Doctors Weigh Female Circumcision, PITTSBURGH POST-
GAZETTE, Sept. 15, 1996, at A13 (reporting the view of Executive Director of Afri-Relief and
Development that female circumcision is not a requirement of Islam, but rather a cultural tra-
dition), with Ostrom, supra note 73 (reporting that some Somalis clearly believe it is required
by their religion).  See also supra notes 33-51 and accompanying text (discussing this general
debate).
91. Paulson, supra note 90.
92. Ostrom, supra note 73; see also Obiora, supra note 17, at 350 (describing legitimacy of
religious rationale, reinforced by the United States Supreme Court in United States v. Seeger,
380 U.S. 163, 176 (1965), which defined “religion” as “a sincere and meaningful belief which
occupies in the life of its possessor a place parallel to that filled by God”).  Despite rhetoric to
the contrary, it seems evident that the Somali refugees in this case could have articulated a con-
stitutionally valid religious rationale for their belief that female circumcision was required by
their iteration of Islam.
93. Ostrom, supra note 81.
94. Telephone Interview with Dr. Leslie Miller, supra note 64; see also supra notes 39-46
and accompanying text (discussing the general view of some Muslims that because female cir-
cumcision is mentioned in a hadith it is a religious requirement).
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form of female circumcision in Somalia, appears to them to reinforce
its divine origins.95
Consistent with this view, one Somali woman who is a Sunni
Muslim “insist[ed] that each of her three young daughters must be
cut.”96  She claimed that “It’s important for [their] health; it’s impor-
tant for religion.  We have to keep the religion.”97  Another woman
noted that “[e]verything we do comes from religion—how we eat,
how we dress, how we talk to people.”98  The hospital is reported to
have been “convinced . . . that as strongly as a Jewish mother believes
her son must be circumcised to be a member of the faith, so do some
Somali Muslim refugees in Seattle believe that their daughters’ geni-
tals must be cut to comply with their religion and demands of their
culture.”99
Finally, although the larger established Somali community in Se-
attle is said to believe that Somali girls who live and are raised in the
United States should not be circumcised,100 its members also appar-
ently believe that the tradition cannot be eradicated simply by telling
the newer immigrants and refugees that it is illegal or contrary to
American culture. “I think the prevailing concept about it is that it
should be diminished as much as possible, and possibly eradicated as
far as girls are concerned,” said the Executive Director of the Somali
group Afrirelief and Development.101  “However,” he added, “the fact
that we came as refugees doesn’t mean we are going to leave our cul-
ture overnight.  The bad parts of our culture we will try to shake off,
gradually.  Now we are at a point as leaders and elders of the com-
munity negotiating with mothers.”102
Faced with these facts, Harborview convened a committee of
doctors to attempt to resolve the seemingly irreconcilable demands
95. Id.; see also supra note 37 (describing interpretive significance of the sunna).
96. Ostrom, supra note 81.
97. Id.
98. Id.
99. Id.
100. See, e.g., Brune, supra note 1 (reporting that the larger Somali community “has essen-
tially agreed that the practice should be ended”).  That certain members of this larger commu-
nity may be deterred by American law and societal disapproval from engaging in the practice
does not mean that everyone will be so deterred.
101. Id.
102. Id.; see also supra note 62 (discussing the irony of women being the most vocal propo-
nents of female circumcision); and infra notes 245-50 and accompanying text (discussing recog-
nition that immigrants’ process of Americanization generally has taken at least two genera-
tions).
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of American culture and the beliefs of the immigrants. The commit-
tee included a urologist, medical ethicists, pediatricians, an obstetri-
cian-gynecologist, hospital administrators, pediatricians, and a plastic
surgeon.103  Dr. James LoGerfo, Harborview’s Medical Director,
stated that “‘[n]o one is contemplating doing those rituals most peo-
ple associate with female circumcision’ . . . . But out of respect for
these women’s beliefs . . . the physicians and others who treat the
Somali families have been meeting to see if the hospital can offer a
compromise solution.”104  Specifically, the committee’s mission was to
work with the affected community to develop an alternative to the
traditional circumcision that would meet both the cultural and relig-
ious needs of that community, and the legal and ethical obligations of
the hospital.105  In the course of its review, the committee asked if per-
forming a symbolic blood-letting on Somali girls would discourage
their parents from sending their daughters back to Africa for a dam-
aging and far more dangerous procedure.106  In asking this question,
the committee was obviously intrigued by the immigrants’ request for
a symbolic sunna that would be at most the medical equivalent of
male circumcision and that would assure that no Somali girls suffered
a more extreme version of that rite.107
The proposal that the hospital begin performing the cut origi-
nally suggested by the immigrant women emerged from the commit-
tee.  The hospital viewed this severely modified sunna as “a largely
symbolic compromise.”108  Hospital spokeswoman Tina Mankowski
described the proposal in medical terms, as “a small cut to the pre-
puce, the hood above the clitoris, with no tissue excised, and this
would be conducted under local anesthetic for children old enough to
103. Telephone Interview with Dr. Leslie Miller, supra note 64.  Interestingly, the plastic
surgeon was involved because, among other reasons, adolescent and teenage girls in the United
States sometimes elect to have surgery performed on their genitals.  For example, some girls
have enlarged or protruding clitorises or labia that make it embarrassing or uncomfortable for
them to appear in public in swimwear and choose to have these parts of their genitalia surgi-
cally reduced.  Id.; see also Ostrom, supra note 81 (reporting that “[m]edical doctors in this
country also do cosmetic surgery on genitals”).
104. Paulson, supra note 90.
105. The hospital was concerned with the possibility that the procedure might violate state
or federal law.  Telephone Interview with Dr. Leslie Miller, supra note 64.
106. See Kelley, supra note 60.
107. Dr. Leslie Miller, in particular, was outspoken on this issue.  See infra notes 141-44 and
accompanying text.
108. Ostrom, supra note 73.
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understand the procedure and give consent in combination with in-
formed consent of the parents.”109
Mankowski further noted that the intent of the hospital was “to
provide a relatively safe procedure to a population of young women
who traditionally have had some horrendous things done to them.”110
One report confirmed that “[m]any of the women requesting circum-
cision for their daughters said the procedure would prevent them
from seeking a more radical procedure.”111  The hospital expressed
the hope and the expectation that the procedure would be a transi-
tional measure that would ultimately lead to the complete abolition
of the practice in the second generation of immigrants.112
News of the hospital’s efforts broke on September 13, 1996, at
the time that the committee made its recommendations, and spread
rapidly across the country, especially within the anti-FGM commu-
nity.  According to one report, the hospital was immediately
“besieged by outraged opponents of female circumcision,”113 a group
which included mostly feminists opposed to FGM.  Among them was
then-United States Representative Patricia Schroeder, who worked
for several years to enact federal legislation prohibiting FGM, and
Meserak “Mimi” Ramsey of the anti-FGM group Forward USA and
International.  Ramsey, a former Ms. Magazine “Woman of the
Year,”114  is a self-described survivor of FGM who is well-known for
her tireless public campaign against the traditional forms of the prac-
tice.115
Schroeder sent Harborview a letter which was quickly made
public, in which she stated that the proposal would contravene fed-
109. Brune, supra note 1.
110. Id.
111. Abu-Nasr, supra note 28; see also Ostrom, supra note 81 (reporting that “[t]he Somali
women [interviewed by Ostrom] say [the symbolic procedure] would fulfill their religious and
cultural needs”).
112. Telephone Interview with Dr. Leslie Miller, supra note 64; see also infra notes 245-50
and accompanying text (discussing view that Americanization of immigrants takes at least two
generations).
113. Hospital Won’t Circumcise Girls, SEATTLE TIMES, Dec. 5, 1996, at B2.
114. See generally Mimi Ramsey: For Selflessly Striving, Despite Her Own Pain, to End the
Mutilation of Young Girls, MS., Jan.-Feb. 1996, at 51 (profiling Ramsey as one of its “Women
of the Year”).
115. Forward USA is a group which, among other things, “seeks to eliminate the ritual [of
FGM] completely.”  Brune, supra note 1.  Ramsey, an Ethiopian immigrant who calls herself a
survivor of FGM, is described as “wag[ing] a one-woman campaign [against FGM], wandering
from one African or Middle Eastern store to another, beseeching immigrants to spare little
girls the painful price their cultures require . . . .”  Abu-Nasr, supra note 28.
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eral law.116  She noted specifically that the law “criminalize[s] the per-
formance of any form of female genital mutilation on minors,” and
wondered, in that context, why “Harborview further has pursued this
issue . . . as to the legality of performing a ritual slicing of young girls’
clitorises.”117  She concluded that “this apparent push for such a bar-
baric procedure by a respected, mainstream medical establishment
both baffles and horrifies me.”118  The hospital has said that it also re-
ceived other letters from Schroeder’s office.119  Dr. Abraham
Bergman, chief of pediatrics at Harborview and the chair of the
committee reviewing the proposal, described the group of letters
from Schroeder and her office as having largely contributed to the
hospital’s ultimate abandonment of the compromise procedure.120
Ramsey responded to Harborview’s proposal in a way that was
equally categorical: “How dare it even cross their mind[?] . . . What
the Somalis, what the immigrants like me need is an education, not
sensitivity to culture.”121  While Ramsey is clear that African culture
has many positive aspects, the practice of, as she calls it, “mutilating
little girls” is not one of them.122  FGM, says Ramsey, “is the most
horrible, horrible thing that is happening to children.  This is the sort
of pain they want to create for the helpless little girls that are Ameri-
116. See Letter from Representative Patricia Schroeder to Dr. James LoGerfo, Medical
Director of the Harborview Medical Center 1 (Oct. 15, 1996) (on file with author) [hereinafter
Schroeder Letter to LoGerfo].  Passages from Schroeder’s letter were quoted by several news-
papers.  See, e.g., Peggy Andersen, Harborview Rejects Female Circumcisions, SEATTLE POST-
INTELLIGENCER, Dec. 5, 1996, at B1; Hospital Won’t Perform Disputed Procedure, AKRON
BEACON J., Dec. 6, 1996, at A7.  Although the FGM statute had been signed when Schroeder
wrote this letter, it did not become law until March 1997.  See infra note 150 and accompanying
text.
117. Schroeder Letter to LoGerfo, supra note 116, at 1.
118. Id.
119. Telephone Interview with Dr. Abraham Bergman, Chief of Pediatrics, Harborview
Medical Center (June 6, 1997).
120. Id.
121. Brune, supra note 1.  This theme of education, not sensitivity, was echoed by Dr. Asha
Mohamud, a Somali immigrant who works to eradicate FGM and who opposed the Harborview
proposal.  Dr. Mohamud, who is familiar with and generally laudatory of Harborview’s com-
mitment to its immigrant patients, noted that
[c]ultures are good and to be respected . . . [b]ut they are not to be respected when
they are harmful to the health of individuals. . . . Doctors have a role to play in edu-
cating women when they’re pregnant, asking them to consider their own bodies, the
problems female genital mutilation has caused them—and asking them not to subject
their daughters to the same thing.
Kelley, supra note 60 (quoting Dr. Mohamud).
122. Remarks by Mimi Ramsey, ABA Annual Convention, San Francisco, Panel on Fe-
male Genital Mutilation (Aug. 3, 1997) [hereinafter Ramsey Remarks].
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cans.  They are born in this country.  They have a right to protect
their bodies.”123  Ramsey insists that education (including the educa-
tional value of legal proscriptions and criminal convictions for child
abuse) is the proper vehicle to ensure the rapid eradication of the
practice.124  In the Harborview context, Ramsey and others were con-
cerned that “even talking about cutting female genitals legitimizes a
barbaric practice, one that disempowers women and serves to keep
them out of the American mainstream.”125
Ramsey’s perspective was shared by others in the immigrant
community,126 at least one of whom publicly questioned the method-
ology of Harborview’s factfinding:
They probably talked to very few people, who probably came
from the [Somalian] countryside . . . . In an urban environment, that
has been eradicated many, many years ago.  There are 20-year-old
[women] who were not circumcised any way.  Those women are do-
ing great.  Harborview was just talking to a few that haven’t even
been educated.127
Schroeder and Ramsey’s view was also shared by others in the
larger American anti-FGM community who “inundated [the hospital]
with hundreds of letters and calls protesting [the proposal].”128  Ac-
cording to one report, “doctors [at Harborview] received letters of
complaint, in some cases with copies sent to their supervisors and
state officials.”129  The letters, described by the doctors as “hate
mail,”130 “condemned what the writers perceived as the doctors’ ad-
vocacy of female circumcision.”131  Dr. Abraham Bergman was most
frequently targeted.132  Dr. Bergman, who is an orthodox Jew, pub-
licly stated his “wish that people who have strong feelings about this
123. Id.
124. Id.
125. Ostrom, supra note 81 (emphasis added) (describing the position of several who op-
pose FGM).
126. See Obiora, supra note 17, at 366 (describing African opposition to the “clinic-
alization” even of the milder forms of the practice on the ground that “it implies the defense of
a ‘culture’ that articulates a gendered universe, insists on a right to be static and fundamentally
cruel to a neat half of the adherents” (internal quotation marks omitted)).
127. Kelley, supra note 60.
128. Dugger, supra note 18.
129. Kelley, supra note 60.
130. Telephone Interview with Dr. Abraham Bergman, supra note 119; Telephone Inter-
view with Dr. Leslie Miller, supra note 64.
131. Kelley, supra note 60.
132. Telephone Interview with Dr. Abraham Bergman, supra note 119.
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issue would calm down and gain some possession of the facts first be-
fore launching their fusillades.”133  He also said that it was “imper-
ative that we try to understand the cultural practices of other people
and that we respect privacy of families and their physicians.”134  Ac-
cording to Dr. Bergman, these last two remarks in particular
prompted “hate mail and death threats for weeks.”135
Most disturbing, and perhaps ultimately dispositive, was the fact
that many of the people who opposed Harborview misunderstood the
nature of the proposed procedure, wrongly believing that it involved
a true circumcision rather than a symbolic cut on the clitoral hood.136
This misunderstanding was, in many instances, shared or perhaps in-
stigated by members of the press, who constantly referred to Harbor-
view’s proposal as “female circumcision” even as they were reporting
the details of the procedure.137  It is entirely likely that Schroeder her-
self shared this misunderstanding.138
As a result of this extraordinary onslaught, Harborview aban-
doned its effort, issuing a final news release stating that its “role in
considering the need for a culturally sensitive, safe alternative to the
practices of female circumcision or female genital mutilation has now
been concluded.”139 In the end, the hospital is said to have found the
effort “too controversial.”140
Dr. Leslie Miller, an obstetrician/gynecologist at Harborview,
continues to treat the same Somali women who initiated this discus-
133. Ostrom, supra note 73.  The fact that Dr. Bergman was identified specifically as “an
orthodox Jew” may have been intended to signal his personal sensitivity to the legitimacy of
circumcisions generally, and to the particular merits in this context of the comparison between
male circumcision and the symbolic cut sought by the immigrants.
134. Id.
135. Telephone Interview with Dr. Abraham Bergman, supra note 119.
136. See, e.g., Chauvin, supra note 69 (stating that “I am among the many people in the
area who were relieved by Harborview’s decision against performing female circumcision”);
Ketteridge, supra note 69 (lamenting Harborview’s decision not to perform “female circumci-
sions” and implying that if insurers pay for male circumcisions, they should also be forced to
pay for the female equivalent).
137. Indeed, many of the articles simultaneously called the proposed procedure a
“circumcision” and quoted language from Schroeder’s letter condemning Harborview for its
consideration of a symbolic version of the practice.  See, e.g., Hospital Won’t Perform Disputed
Procedure, supra note 116.  The fact that the newspaper previously had published the hospital’s
description of the proposal, making it clear that it did not involve circumcision, seemed not to
matter.  See, e.g., Hospital Won’t Circumcise Girls, supra note 113.  This contradiction frus-
trated Harborview officials immensely.  See supra text accompanying note 133.
138. See infra Part III (discussing implications of the federal statute prohibiting FGM).
139. Dugger, supra note 18.
140. Kelley, supra note 60.
COLEMAN 07/15/98  11:51 AM
1998] THE SEATTLE COMPROMISE 749
sion.  All have assured her that the hospital’s decision not to perform
the compromise procedure has had and will continue to have no ef-
fect on their commitment to have their daughters circumcised.  They
have told Dr. Miller that if they can afford it, they will send their
daughters back to Somalia.  If they cannot, they will send their
daughters to one of the local midwives.
At the same time, Dr. Miller’s patients have told her that they
are confused that Americans encourage the circumcision of their
sons, but refuse a less invasive symbolic sunna for their daughters.141
“We will cut the whole foreskin off a penis,” said Dr. Miller, relaying
their frustration, “but we won’t even consider a cut, a sunna, cutting
the prepuce, a little bloodletting (on a girl).”142  To this day, Dr.
Miller claims, the immigrants have not been given a satisfactory ex-
planation for the distinction, or for the hospital’s and the larger
American community’s rejection of the symbolic circumcision that
would have saved their daughters from what they (and, normally, we)
understand to be an inevitable and significantly worse fate.143  Ironi-
cally, Dr. Miller foresees the day when the hospital and the commu-
nity will have to confront the medical and emotional repercussions of
the midwives’ work.144
III.  THE LEGAL IMPLICATIONS OF HARBORVIEW’S PROPOSAL
According to published reports, “[i]t was never clear whether the
[symbolic cut proposed by Harborview] would have violated the
law.”145  The matter was never formally litigated, and the only legal
141. Telephone Interview with Dr. Leslie Miller, supra note 64.
142. Ostrom, supra note 81.
143. Telephone Interview with Dr. Leslie Miller, supra note 64.
144. Id.  Although the federal ban on FGM would clearly apply to midwives, there is sig-
nificant doubt in the immigrant community that this ban will have any effect on their work be-
cause there is no one to complain to the authorities about particular mutilations: the children
who are being cut are generally too young or too attached to their parents to complain, and the
parents, who would normally be the ones to lodge such a complaint, are the very persons re-
questing the procedure.  Family members or friends who oppose the procedure and who know
the identities of the midwives do not complain because they fear that the parents also would be
prosecuted and do not wish to break up the family.  The only such prosecution that has ever
been attempted in this country failed because the prosecutor, armed with ample evidence that a
two-year-old girl was severely mutilated, was unable to prove who had actually cut the girl be-
cause no one would testify against the defendant.  See Coleman, supra note 3, at 1113
(describing this Georgia case).
145. Abu-Nasr, supra note 28; see also Ostrom, supra note 73 (“A new federal law has out-
lawed female genital circumcision, but it’s not clear whether the language of the law applies to
a proposal by doctors at Harborview Medical Center.”); Hospital Won’t Circumcise Girls, supra
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analysis undertaken—by the Washington State Attorney General
representing Harborview—has never been made public.146  In addi-
tion, those who spoke out publicly on behalf of or against the pro-
posal, including Schroeder, lent the impression that the issue would
certainly be hotly contested.
In fact, however, the legal implications of the hospital’s proposal
were relatively straightforward.  As Schroeder insisted, an important
question was whether the proposal violated the new federal statute
banning FGM.147  Even more important was the issue whether the
suggested procedure would have violated state child abuse laws.  In
the event that it was found to contravene those laws, the proposal
also would have raised substantial equal protection questions.
The threshold issue Schroeder posed, whether the symbolic cir-
cumcision would have violated the federal ban on FGM, is the easiest
to address.  Schroeder took the position that “[w]hat Harborview ap-
pears to be considering would violate [the] clear intent [of the law],”
which she described as “to criminalize any medically unnecessary
procedure involving female genitalia.”148  Schroeder admitted, how-
ever, that at the time she took this position, she had not seen a copy
of Harborview’s proposal, nor had she been informed about the sym-
bolic nature of the procedure at issue.149
note 113 (“While the procedure under consideration at Harborview . . . may not even be ad-
dressed by the [federal] law, ‘we’re not going to do it’, [a] Harborview spokesman . . . said.”).
146. The author requested information concerning the state’s legal analysis from Lisa Vin-
cler, Assistant Attorney General charged with representing Harborview Medical Center, but
was told that the state’s analysis was protected by both attorney-client confidentiality and the
work product doctrine.
147. See Schroeder Letter to LoGerfo, supra note 116, at 1.
148. Id.  This was not the first time Schroeder actively opposed an effort to “medicalize”
FGM.  In 1995, she convinced the U.S. House of Representatives to pass a resolution “urging
the President to help end the practice of female genital mutilation worldwide.” House Passes
Schroeder Resolution on Female Genital Mutilation, Government Press Release, June 7, 1995,
available in 1995 WL 14249480.  According to the government press release announcing the
resolution, Schroeder’s effort “was prompted in part by the Egyptian government’s effort to
medicalize FGM.”  Id.  Schroeder was concerned that Egypt no longer intended to seek a total
ban on FGM in that country, or to punish those who engaged in the practice.  See id.  She noted
that, unlike the Egyptian government’s act to medicalize the procedure, the House of Repre-
sentatives “resolution [was] in the true spirit of the [U.N. International Conference on Popula-
tion and Development in] Cairo.”  Id. (quoting Schroeder).  Schroeder’s work in connection
with this resolution may also help to explain her quick condemnation of Harborview’s pro-
posal, which may have seemed to her to be an effort in the United States to do what Egypt had
done, i.e., to medicalize FGM.
149. See id.  In her letter to Dr. LoGerfo, Schroeder specifically notes that the hospital had
not yet “answer[ed] an August 19 inquiry from [her] office asking for a copy of the committee’s
recommendation.”  Id.  She also indicates that she wishes “to hear directly from [the hospital]
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The Federal Prohibition of Female Genital Mutilation Act, the
statute to which Schroeder refers, became law in March of 1997.  It
proscribes the practice of “female genital mutilation” in the United
States, and defines FGM as “the removal or infibulation (or both) of
the whole or part of the clitoris, the labia minora, or labia majora;” it
also provides for the punishment of anyone who “knowingly circum-
cises, excises, or infibulates the whole or any part of the labia majora
or labia minora or clitoris of [a child].”150
Because the symbolic cut or “mere bloodletting” contemplated
by the hospital was not a circumcision,151 and did not involve the exci-
sion or infibulation of any tissue, it is difficult to comprehend the ba-
sis for Schroeder’s conclusion that the proposal would have violated
federal law.152  As a textual matter, the procedure did not fit within
the statutory definition of FGM and thus would not have violated the
statute.  The statute’s sparse legislative history—apart from Schroe-
der’s own expanded rendition of that history in her letter to Harbor-
view—provides little additional support for her interpretation; in-
stead, that legislative history appears to underscore the fact that
Schroeder and her colleagues were concerned exclusively about the
practice of the traditional forms of FGM on United States soil.153  For
example, all of the reported congressional statements about the leg-
islation described only those traditional practices.154  Nothing in those
reports or in related documents indicates that either Schroeder or
others in Congress or in the administration even contemplated the
possibility of a symbolic version of the mutilations that were prohib-
ited textually.  Nor is there any indication in that history that, as she
exactly what [it] is considering.”  Id. at 2.  Among her questions in this regard are “how deep
the cut would be, how the procedure would . . . be done, what the possible complications would
be,” etc.  Id.
150. Federal Prohibition of Female Genital Mutilation Act, 8 U.S.C.A. § 1374(c) (West
Supp. 1997) (defining FGM and providing for information to be given to immigrants from cul-
tures that engage in the practice); 18 U.S.C.A. § 116(a) (West Supp. 1997) (prohibiting the
practice of FGM and setting punishments for its practice in the United States).
151. See supra notes 108-09 and accompanying text (describing the true nature of the pro-
cedure).
152. See supra notes 116-18 and accompanying text (describing and quoting from Schroe-
der’s letter).
153. See Christine Anasmith, Seattle Doctors Consider Modified Female Circumcision
(National Public Radio broadcast, Oct. 17, 1996).  While Schroeder clearly believes that so-
called “lesser” forms of FGM, such as the Harborview proposal, would be illegal under the
federal statute, her colleagues admit “it’s unclear whether the procedure Harbor View [sic]
proposes would violate the law since it removes no tissue.”  Id.
154. See, e.g., supra note 28 (statement of Sen. Moseley-Braun).
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suggests in her letter, “[t]he clear intent of the legislation . . . was to
criminalize any medically unnecessary procedure involving female
genitalia.”155  Indeed, it is rather unlikely that Congress would have
enacted such a broad prohibition since it made substantial efforts to
steer the discussion away from any implication that the new prohibi-
tion could jeopardize the country’s own traditional practice of male
circumcision, a practice which itself is of questionable medical
value.156  Because a symbolic cut, or even the removal only of the
prepuce of the clitoris, would be directly analogous to that practice, it
is likely that such relatively minor forms of female circumcision were
not contemplated at all, or that they were discussed and rejected, or
expressly left out of the statute.  As a result, there is little merit to
Schroeder’s claim the Harborview proposal would have violated even
the “spirit” of the statute.
It is possible, of course, that Schroeder stated her position pre-
maturely, before she received all of the information necessary for her
analysis.  Indeed, the fact that she expressed concern about not re-
ceiving the details of the procedure and pointed to the “dangerous,
deadly and psychologically scarring” nature of “female genital muti-
lation” lends some credence to this possibility.157  That she was
“baffle[d] and horrifie[d]” by the hospital’s “apparent push for such a
barbaric procedure” also suggests she was not fully informed.158  After
all, how could she be “baffled and horrified” by a procedure that was
less “barbaric” than male circumcision, which she did also not seek to
proscribe?
On the other hand, given that Harborview’s explanation of its
proposal was publicly disseminated and that Schroeder’s office cer-
tainly had access to this information, it is also possible that she was
trying to ensure that despite the language and history of the federal
statute, no form of female circumcision, symbolic or otherwise, was
practiced in the United States.  In fact, Harborview publicly dissemi-
nated details of the proposal a few weeks after Schroeder’s principal
155. Schroeder Letter to LoGerfo, supra note 116, at 1 (emphasis added); see also Schroe-
der Calls on HHS to Education [sic] Harborview Medical Center About Female Genital Mutila-
tion, Press Release, Oct. 18, 1996 (on file with the Duke Law Journal) (quoting Schroeder as
saying “[t]he clear intent of my legislation was to ban FGM in all forms because of its serious
health and psychological consequences”).
156. See supra note 28 and infra note 272 (describing this effort) and infra note 185
(describing the current view that male circumcision is not medically indicated).
157. Schroeder Letter to LoGerfo, supra note 116, at 2 (quoting the American Medical As-
sociation).
158. Id. at 1.
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letter to the hospital, but she never retracted her position.  As a result,
it was this misleading letter—coupled with Schroeder’s incendiary
language about FGM—which became the principal fodder for the
public opposition to the procedure.159 Schroeder certainly had the
right to argue that parents should not be permitted even to perform a
symbolic cut on their daughters.160 What is unfortunate is that she
chose to clothe that view in inappropriate legal garb.161
159. See supra note 120 and accompanying text (indicating Dr. Abraham Bergman’s view of
Schroeder’s influence on Harborview’s ultimate decision to abandon the proposal).  Indeed, a
November 19, 1996, response to Schroeder from the hospital’s Medical Director, Dr. James
LoGerfo, appears to confirm this influence.  Specifically, the letter reportedly informed Schro-
eder that “the hospital had decided against offering the procedure [and] . . . commended
Schroeder for her ‘leadership on this topic which has been important to all of us involved in the
care of African women.’”  Andersen, supra note 116 (quoting letter from Harborview to Schro-
eder).
160. See infra notes 222-25 and 233-34 and accompanying text (discussing policy argument
that even the symbolic procedure should not be performed).
161. Even if Harborview’s proposal could somehow be interpreted to fall within the ambit
of the federal statute, there is a substantial question whether the law, enacted pursuant to Con-
gress’ Commerce and Treaty powers, is itself constitutional in light of United States v. Lopez,
514 U.S. 549 (1995).  Congress may have recognized the Lopez issue, emphasizing in its legisla-
tive findings that FGM “infringes upon the guarantees of rights secured by Federal and State
law, both statutory and constitutional,” and that “the unique circumstances surrounding the
practice of female genital mutilation place it beyond the ability of any single State or local ju-
risdiction to control.”  Federal Prohibition of Female Genital Mutilation Act of 1995, Pub. L.
No. 104-208, § 645(a)(3)-(4), 110 Stat. 3009-70 (1996).  The question of the statute’s constitu-
tionality has yet formally to be resolved; however, given that Congress has not expressly found
that immigrants will travel across state lines to obtain the services of a circumcisor, and that
state hospitals like Harborview are not likely to be viewed as instrumentalities of interstate
commerce in this context, it is quite possible that the Commerce Clause basis for the statute
would fail.  See Brzonkala v. Virginia Polytechnic Inst. & State Univ., No. 96-1814, 1997 WL
785529, at *16 (4th Cir. Dec. 23, 1997) (dismissing summarily the argument that the analogous
federal Violence Against Women Act was a regulation of an “instrumentality” or “channel” of
commerce).  The court in Brzonkala did find that statute constitutional under Lopez’s alterna-
tive “substantially affects interstate commerce” criterion.  See id.  But as the court stated, this
criterion was met only because Congress had voluminous evidence to support this finding.  See
id. at *17.  To my knowledge, no such support exists for the federal Prohibition of Female
Genital Mutilation Act.
In addition, as I will show later, see infra notes 164-79 and accompanying text, FGM in its
traditional forms can constitute child abuse, which itself is an area of the law traditionally re-
served to the states.
The federal statute has also been attacked because, rather than proscribing child abuse
and specifically defining abuse to include mutilation, it proscribes only a specific traditional
practice in which only certain ethnic (primarily African) minorities engage.  This narrow pro-
scription may expose the statute to the challenge that it discriminates on the basis of race or
ethnicity.  This concern often prompts comparison between the federal statute in the United
States and other bans against FGM by Western countries, principally France, which have en-
acted more general, non-discriminatory laws. Ironically, because these foreign statutes would
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While federal statutory law was inapplicable to Harborview’s
proposal, there is no question that state child abuse laws and the
Equal Protection Clause were directly implicated.162  As a result,
whether the proposal was lawful rests upon an analysis of those two
doctrines.163
The State of Washington defines child “abuse or neglect” as “the
injury . . . or maltreatment of a child . . . by any person under circum-
likely be seen in the United States as an usurpation of state child abuse laws, it is unlikely that
the approach they take was ever seriously contemplated in this country.
Finally, the statute may be challenged on the ground that it discriminates against boys.
While this challenge has less merit because of the significant differences between traditional
male circumcision and female genital mutilation, there has already been some litigation over
the question.  See Andersen, supra note 116 (describing federal lawsuit challenging North Da-
kota statute outlawing female genital mutilation on grounds that it unconstitutionally discrimi-
nates against men and boys).
162. From the Western perspective, the view that FGM constitutes child abuse is not novel.
In fact, this argument is one of the original and principal international (again, Western) weap-
ons in the fight against FGM.  See Boulware-Miller, supra note 17, at 165-69 (describing the
argument against female circumcision as a violation of the rights of the child).  For example,
Boulware-Miller argues that FGM violates the U.N. Declaration of the Rights of the Child,
which provides that “children must be guaranteed the opportunity to develop physically in a
healthy and normal way.”  Id. at 165-66.  “In the process of being circumcised,” Boulware-
Miller explains, “girls are routinely tied down, forced to display their sexual organs, and sub-
jected to an intensely painful operation when they are too young to understand why the opera-
tion is performed or to give meaningful consent.”  Id. at 166.  She also argues that this violation
is compounded by the “betrayal” at least some children feel when they learn their mothers
condoned their pain.  See id. at 167-68.
Although they are not formally relevant to analysis under United States law, there are
substantial policy and personal implications to characterizing FGM as child abuse.  Boulware-
Miller finds that challenging
female circumcision as a violation of the rights of the child suggests that women who
permit the operation are incompetent and abusive mothers who, in some ways, do
not love their children. . . . [This approach also] conflicts with parents’ desires to rear
children independently and their notions of what is in their children’s best interests.
While women may not wish to see their daughters harmed, they may also feel
strongly that they should be able to rear their children according to their own cul-
tural norms and traditions.  Besides, if mothers value the economic, social, and cul-
tural benefits of the operation, they are unlikely to be persuaded that it should not be
performed on their daughters. . . . [Another] problem with this approach is that it al-
most exclusively focuses on the physical harm done to a child when she is circum-
cised and does not address the positive feelings she may have as a circumcised
woman. . . . [Finally], many young girls believe that they want to be circumcised.  The
stigma associated with not being circumcised attaches early, virtually compelling a
choice to undergo the operation.
Id. at 166-67.  At the very least, these problems with the child abuse approach should operate
as a caveat for those working with the affected immigrant communities.  They also emphasize
the tremendous cultural impasse surrounding the practice of FGM, and the importance of re-
solving the impasse without engaging its two sides in this legal and philosophical debate.
163. While the Washington state legislature has contemplated making FGM a specific of-
fense, it has yet to do so.
COLEMAN 07/15/98  11:51 AM
1998] THE SEATTLE COMPROMISE 755
stances which indicate that the child’s . . . health, welfare, and safety
is harmed.”164 Acts which constitute prima facie abuse include
“[i]nflicting physical injury on a child by other than accidental means,
causing . . . disfigurement, skin bruising, impairment of physical or
emotional health, or loss or impairment of any bodily function.”165
The state’s purpose in enacting its child abuse and neglect
scheme is to “safeguard the general welfare of . . . children.”166  This
purpose encompasses ensuring the child’s “right to conditions of
minimal nurture, health, and safety.”167  Thus, while the state ex-
pressly views the bond between parent or guardian and child as being
“of paramount importance,”168 it intervenes when children are sub-
jected to “instances of nonaccidental injury, neglect, death, sexual
abuse and cruelty”169 committed by “their parents, custodians or
guardians.”170
The State of Washington notes, however, that its child abuse
statute “shall not be construed to authorize interference with child-
raising practices, including reasonable parental discipline, which are
not proved to be injurious to the child’s health, welfare and safety.”171
A related administrative provision attempts to explain the difference
between child abuse and child-raising practices or reasonable paren-
tal discipline:172 “the physical discipline of a child is not unlawful
when it is reasonable and moderate and is inflicted by a parent,
164. WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 26.44.020(12) (West 1997).
165. Id. § 388-15-130(3)(a) (setting forth authority of child protective services to investigate
child abuse, neglect, or exploitation and defining these terms).
166. Id.
167. Id. § 26.44.010.
168. Id.
169. Id.
170. Id.  Washington’s child abuse statute is typical with respect to its definition of abuse
and neglect, as well as to its underlying purpose and justification.  See, e.g., ARIZ. REV. STAT.
ANN. § 13-3623 (West 1997) (defining child abuse as injury to a child producing physical or
emotional harm); CAL. PENAL CODE § 273a (West Supp. 1998) (criminalizing willful harm or
injury to a child and endangering a child’s person or health); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11, § 1103
(1996) (defining abuse as physical injury to a child by torture, exploitation, maltreatment, mis-
treatment, or means other than accidental); MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 750.136b (West 1997)
(defining abuse as causing physical or mental harm to a child).
171. WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 26.44.010.  The definition of “child abuse and neglect”
given in 1993 legislation also contained this caveat, as well as the separate condition that
“nothing in this section shall be used to prohibit the reasonable use of corporal punishment as a
means of discipline.”  See id. § 26.44.020 historical and statutory notes.  The right to use rea-
sonable corporal punishment as a means of discipline still exists, although in a separate provi-
sion.  See id. § 26.44.015(2).
172. Id. § 9A.16.100 (defining use of force on children and actions presumed unreasonable).
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teacher, or guardian for purpose of restraining or correcting a
child.”173 Acts which are expressly “presumed unreasonable,” and
therefore illegal, include “cutting of a child” or “doing any other act
that is likely to cause and which does cause bodily harm greater than
transient pain or minor temporary marks.”174
No reported cases in the State of Washington involve this last,
most clearly applicable provision.  However, given the broad language
of the child abuse laws generally, and the flexibility and discretion
that are built into these laws,175 Harborview’s proposed procedure
could easily have been interpreted to fall within the proscription: Be-
cause it required a doctor to “nick” the hood of the clitoris sufficient
to draw blood, the procedure would have involved “nonaccidental”
(albeit minimal) “cutting,”176 and would likely have caused some
(albeit minimal) “disfigurement [and] skin bruising.”177 Thus, even if
the parents believed the procedure was necessary to ensure that their
daughters are disciplined and otherwise sexually restrained,178 ac-
cording to the statute and its related administrative provisions, the
procedure could have been considered per se unreasonable and thus
illegal.179
It is equally possible that the child welfare authorities in Wash-
ington could have concluded that the procedure did not violate the
law.  This possibility exists because the statute and administrative
regulations both appear to take into account the degree of harm in-
flicted on a child in determining whether there is child abuse.  For
example, the principal statutory provision makes clear that one pur-
pose of the legislative scheme is to prevent endangerment of a child’s
“health, welfare, and safety.”180  One can certainly argue that Harbor-
173. Id.
174. Id.
175. Washington’s child abuse law is purposefully broad, since it is designed to cover all
conduct (whether or not it has occurred or been contemplated previously) which actually
threatens the health and well-being of a child.  Interview with Jeff Norman, Washington State
Child Protective Services (on file with author).
176. Under Washington law, cutting a child is presumed unreasonable.  See WASH. REV.
CODE ANN. § 9A.16.100.
177. See Wash. Rev. Code Ann. § 388-15-130(3)(a).
178. See supra note 87 and accompanying text (describing Somali parents’ belief that if
their daughters are not circumcised, they will “run[ ] wild,” and that circumcision is necessary
to “ensur[e] a girl’s good behavior”).
179. See WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 9A.16.100 (stating that parental discipline is only per-
missible if it is also reasonable).  The state hospital would also have been subject to the prohibi-
tion as the parents’ agent.
180. WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 26.44.020(12).
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view intended nothing of such great magnitude and, more impor-
tantly, that nothing of such great magnitude would have resulted
from the symbolic circumcision.  This interpretation of the statutory
language is also consistent with the language of the applicable ad-
ministrative regulation, which “presume[s] unreasonable” only those
injuries “that [are] likely to cause and which do[ ] cause bodily harm
greater than transient pain or minor temporary marks.”181  Under this
regulation, it is possible that the symbolic circumcision proposed by
Harborview—a small “nick” on the hood above the clitoris, just
enough to draw blood182—could have been considered a “child-raising
practice[ ]” involving “reasonable parental discipline,”183 because the
harm that would have resulted, including both the pain attendant to
the procedure and any subsequent scarring, would have been mini-
mal.184
If the State of Washington took the position that the symbolic
circumcision was not child abuse, the matter would remain a question
of state law.  On the other hand, if the state decided that the proce-
dure constituted child abuse, its interference with the symbolic act
would implicate equal protection principles because the state does
not similarly bar the more severe cutting of male children.185  The
181. WASH. ADMIN. CODE § 9A.16.100 (emphasis added).  Child welfare authorities in at
least some other jurisdictions have taken such an interpretation of child abuse statutes and re-
lated administrative provisions.  See V.I. CODE ANN. tit. 14, § 507 (1997) (incorporating lan-
guage almost identical to that of Washington); see also ARK. CODE ANN. § 12-12-503 (Michie
1995); CAL. PENAL CODE § 273a (West 1998); COLO. REV. STAT. § 19-1-103 (1997); GA. CODE
ANN. § 19-13-1 (1997); IND. CODE ANN. § 31-34-1-15 (Michie 1997); MO. ANN. STAT. § 210.110
(West 1996).
182. Telephone Interview with Dr. Leslie Miller, supra note 64 (setting out Dr. Miller’s de-
scription of the symbolic sunna at issue in the immigrants’, and ultimately the hospital’s, pro-
posal).
183. WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 26.44.010.
184. WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 9A.16.100.
185. This argument assumes that male circumcision is not medically indicated.  I believe
that this assumption is warranted because it represents the current trend in medical thinking.
First, the American Academy of Pediatrics (AAP) does not suggest that the procedure is medi-
cally indicated.  Rather, it outlines the purported medical benefits and risks of the operation,
and leaves the decision whether to circumcise to the individual contemplating the procedure.
See generally Report of the Task Force on Circumcision, 84 PEDIATRICS 388 (1989).  Despite
the AAP’s listing of six “good reasons” for choosing circumcision, current medical thinking
acknowledges only one—the potential for lowering an infant’s “chances of getting a urinary
tract infection in the first year of life”—as having an independent medical basis.  Interview with
Dr. Deborah L. Squire, Associate Professor, Duke University Pediatrics Department, in Dur-
ham, N.C. (Nov. 19, 1997) (on file with author).  And even that basis is in question because the
relative incidence of such infections in circumcised and uncircumcised infants is “statistically
insignificant.”  Id.  Moreover, the single study upon which the infection argument is based did
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Equal Protection Clause requires that “similarly-situated” persons be
treated alike under the law, and conversely, does not permit gender-
based classifications absent “an exceedingly persuasive justifica-
tion.”186
not take into consideration that pediatricians and parents may have contributed to the increase
in infection rates in uncircumcised infants in their attempts prematurely to retract and clean
under the infant foreskin.  Id.  The other five medical arguments in favor of circumcision—
reduction in rates of penile cancer, sexually transmitted disease, foreskin infection, swelling of
the urethral opening, and general genital hygiene—listed by the American Academy of Pediat-
rics are in fact all related to hygiene; if the parent and later the child is taught and maintains
good hygiene practices, all of these conditions are similarly eliminated.  Id.  Thus, there is no
need to have a child circumcised for these reasons, particularly when “it is easier to clean under
the foreskin than behind the ears.” Id.
The notion that male circumcision should be treated as child abuse is not a new one.
This suggestion was made in the legal literature as early as 1984.  See William E. Brigman, Cir-
cumcision as Child Abuse: The Legal and Constitutional Issues, 23 J. FAM. L. 337, 337-38
(1984).  More recently, men’s groups have formed specifically to urge legislative action on the
issue.  See Cecelia Goodnow, Time Doesn’t Heal Division Over This Issue[—]Research Revives
Age-Old Debate: To Cut or Not?, SEATTLE POST-INTELLIGENCER, Aug. 18, 1992, at C1
(describing advocacy groups decrying male circumcision as child abuse).  Most recently, these
groups have argued, inter alia, that statutes banning FGM discriminate on the basis of gender,
and that the legislation must to be redrawn to include both male and female circumcision.  See
Andersen, supra note 125 (discussing federal suit filed by a men’s group in North Dakota chal-
lenging an anti-FGM statute in that state as a violation of equal protection.  The suit was dis-
missed on standing grounds and appealed to the United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth
Circuit).
186. The Supreme Court articulated and further explained this standard most recently in
United States v. Virginia, 116 S. Ct. 2264, 2274 (1996).  Specifically, the Court noted that gen-
der-based classifications are subject to heightened equal protection scrutiny, and required that
a state provide an “exceedingly persuasive justification” for distinctions in this category.  Id.
The Court further noted that this standard can be met by a showing that the gender-based clas-
sification “serves important governmental objectives and that the discriminatory means em-
ployed are substantially related to the achievement of those objectives.” Id. at 2275 (internal
quotation marks omitted) (quoting Mississippi Univ. for Women v. Hogan, 458 U.S. 718, 724
(1982)).  Finally, the Court stated that “[t]he justification must be genuine, not hypothesized or
invented post hoc in response to litigation.”  Id.; see also Hogan, 458 U.S. at 724 (articulating
“exceedingly persuasive justification” test for gender-based classifications).  This Fourteenth
Amendment doctrine applies exclusively to the government and to private institutions that
otherwise satisfy state action requirements.  See In re Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3, 11 (1883)
(articulating the Amendment’s state action requirement and noting that “[i]ndividual invasion
of individual rights is not the subject-matter of the [Fourteenth] amendment”); PAUL BREST &
SANFORD LEVINSON, PROCESSES OF CONSTITUTIONAL DECISIONMAKING, CASES AND
MATERIALS 1301 (3d ed. 1992) (“Almost without exception . . . the provisions of the Constitu-
tion are addressed to governmental entities and officials.”).  Because the Harborview Medical
Center is a state owned and operated facility, there is no question that the doctrine, with its at-
tendant proscription of gender discrimination, applies to the hospital’s activities.  There is also
no question that it would apply equally to private hospitals that for funding or other reasons
could be considered state actors.
Harborview’s refusal to accommodate the parents of Somali girls, and the state’s even-
tual treatment of symbolic circumcisions as child abuse, may also create an impermissible eth-
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As I noted in Part I, the comparison between FGM and male cir-
cumcision is usually a flawed one, because the two practices differ
substantially both as to their medical or physical aspects and as to
their underlying motivations.187
First, male circumcision typically involves only the removal of
the foreskin of the penis.188  In the United States, this procedure is
generally performed in a hospital, often with local anesthetic.189  A
small percentage of circumcisions are performed in ritual Jewish
ceremonies without these safeguards.190  The infant experiences pain
along with the surgery, and the resulting wound takes approximately
one week to ten days to heal.191  After that time, there are no gener-
ally acknowledged ramifications from a properly performed proce-
dure.192  Despite suspicions and theories to the contrary, where the
procedure is properly performed, there is no known future pain and
suffering, and there is no known sexual dysfunction.193
There are three stated motivations for male circumcision: relig-
ion, hygiene, and custom.  Religion provides the principal rationale
for Muslim and Jewish parents, who believe that Islam and Judaism
require the practice.  Other parents may choose to circumcise their
infant boys for health reasons, believing that the surgery will diminish
the likelihood that their children will suffer infections or other ail-
ments in the future.  This rationale has been the subject of much de-
bate in the medical community; however current medical thinking
nicity or national origin-based distinction because the hospital sometimes performs surgery to
reduce the size of the external genitalia of American teenaged girls.  See supra note 103.  While
this procedure is not well-known, it apparently is understood to be an appropriate way to re-
duce the size of allegedly abnormal genitalia.  Depending upon the medical necessity for that
procedure in individual cases, the state may not be able adequately to distinguish between al-
lowing genital tissue removal in cases where American girls or their parents request it for non-
medical reasons, and denying a symbolic prick of the clitoris when Somali girls or their parents
request it for cultural and especially for religious reasons.
187. See supra note 58 and accompanying text (introducing this argument).
188. See Abbie J. Chessler, Comment, Justifying the Unjustifiable: Rite and Wrong, 45
BUFF. L. REV. 555, 564 (1997).
189. AMERICAN ACADEMY OF PEDIATRICS, CIRCUMCISION: PROS AND CONS, GUIDE-
LINES FOR PARENTS (1995) [hereinafter AAP CIRCUMCISION PAMPHLET].
190. See Chessler, supra note 188, at 564.
191. See AAP CIRCUMCISION PAMPHLET, supra note 189.
192. See id.  (“Problems after a circumcision are very rare.”), id. (“It takes about 1 week to
10 days for the penis to fully heal. . . .”).
193. Cf. Chessler, supra note 188, at 570-73 (discussing theory that male circumcision can
cause physical and psychological problems).
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suggests that the surgery is not indicated.194  The most popular reason
for male circumcision is custom.  As the American Academy of Pedi-
atrics has noted, “[m]any parents choose to have their sons circum-
cised because ‘all the other men in the family were circumcised’ or
because they don’t want their son to feel ‘different’.”195
On the other hand, FGM traditionally has involved the removal
at least of part of the clitoris.196  In more severe forms, it involves the
removal of all of the clitoris, all of the clitoris and the labia, or all of
the clitoris, the labia, and a procedure called “infibulation,” in which
the resulting wound is stitched closed leaving only a small opening
through which urine and, later, menstrual fluid can pass.197  In these
forms, as Pat Schroeder correctly noted, “There is no similarity
[between FGM and male circumcision] unless one considers circum-
cision amputation.”198  Although medicalized in some places, FGM is
generally performed by a traditional circumcisor or midwife who uses
rough tools and no anesthesia.199  Mimi Ramsey has described cases
where battery acid was used after the procedure to seal the wound
and to stop the bleeding.200  The ramifications of the traditional forms
of FGM include excessive bleeding (sometimes causing the death of
the child) and pain; both can last a lifetime.201  When the girl reaches
adolescence and adulthood, she will not experience sexual pleasure
as we know it since she has, for all practical purposes, lost her sexual
organs.  Depending upon the type of FGM she has suffered, she may
have to be cut open to have intercourse and to give birth.202
194. See, e.g., Brigman, supra note 185, at 337-38 (arguing male circumcision is not medi-
cally warranted, has no significant psychological benefits, and poses major health risks); Good-
now, supra note 185 (describing controversy over medical necessity for male circumcision); see
also supra note 185 (explaining the “health” rationale and questioning its validity).
195. AAP CIRCUMCISION PAMPHLET, supra note 189.
196. But cf. Obiora, supra note 17, at 288 (noting that in its modern, “sanitized” forms, it
may include merely the removal of the prepuce or hood of the clitoris, or the symbolic prick on
the hood that was at issue in the Harborview proposal).
197. See id. at 289.
198. 139 CONG. REC. H7546-04 (daily ed. Oct. 7, 1993) (statement of Rep. Schroeder); see
also Abu-Nasr, supra note 28 (reporting that Schroeder said that FGM “‘[is] not like circumci-
sion for men.  It’s much like Lorena Bobbitt’”).  Schroeder’s view is consistent with the medical
facts.  See Toubia, supra note 17, at 712 (“The mildest form [of FGM], clitoridectomy, is ana-
tomically equivalent to amputation of the penis.”).
199. See Boulware-Miller, supra note 17, at 174 (describing medicalization in urban Soma-
lia).
200. See Ramsey Remarks, supra note 122.
201. See Coleman, supra note 3, at 1112.
202. See Gunning, supra note 17, at 196-97 (describing complications with procedure); Os-
trom, supra note 81 (noting complications typical of FGM).
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The stated motivation for this practice varies.  Sometimes it is
seen as a rite of passage into adulthood, although it generally appears
to be performed on younger children, including infants.203  Whatever
its status as a rite of passage, its proponents almost always say it is
necessary to prevent the girl from engaging in sexual activity, to keep
her chaste and pure for her husband, so that she does not become a
“harlot.”204
Because of these profound differences between the traditional
forms of FGM and male circumcision, equal protection challenges to
state statutes outlawing FGM brought by circumcised males will
likely fail on the ground that boys and girls are not “similarly situ-
ated” for the purposes of those statutes.  For the same reasons, the
analogous argument made by practitioners of the traditional forms of
FGM—that equal protection doctrine requires that they be treated
the same as practitioners of male circumcision—likely would not suc-
ceed. 
The Harborview proposal was clearly different, however, be-
cause unlike the traditional forms of FGM, it would have been less
injurious to the health, welfare and safety of girls than male circumci-
sion is to the health, welfare and safety of boys.  Specifically, while
the symbolic female circumcision would have involved only a small
incision on the hood of the clitoris, an incision that was accurately
characterized as a “mere bloodletting,” male circumcision always in-
volves the cutting as well as the removal of tissue (the foreskin of the
penis).  Skin bruising and disfigurement always accompany the ac-
cepted procedure, and these injuries typically take some time to heal.
The emotional consequences of the two procedures could be charac-
terized as equivalent; although again, the fact that the Harborview
proposal contemplated obtaining the actual consent of the girls,
where boys are rarely in a position to give their consent to circumci-
203. See Chessler, supra note 188, at 556-59.
204. See Coleman, supra note 3, at 1112.  It is largely this issue of intent that has been cen-
tral to the ability of FGM opponents to steer any conversation away from male circumcision
and to turn FGM into a women’s rights issue.  This approach is entirely legitimate, at least from
the Western perspective.  However, one unfortunate result is that it also has caused the conver-
sation to steer away from the evident child abuse implications of the practice, implications
which, again from the Western perspective, are equally legitimate.  Mimi Ramsey has success-
fully steered the conversation in both directions.  She emphasizes the child abuse implications,
noting, for example, that FGM “is the most horrible, horrible thing that is happening to chil-
dren” and that American-born children, whatever their parents’ country of origin, deserve the
right assured to all other American children not to be mutilated.   See Ostrom, supra note 81.
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sion, makes it arguable that the symbolic female circumcision actu-
ally would be less injurious in this respect as well.205 
Thus, given the nature of the procedure proposed by Harbor-
view, there is for the first time a form of FGM that is comparable to
male circumcision,206 so that girls and boys are “similarly situated” for
equal protection purposes. Under these circumstances, the question
becomes whether the hospital can provide a legitimate “exceedingly
persuasive justification” for its final decision to discriminate against
the wishes of the parents of the Somali girls, and more generally,
whether the State of Washington could provide such a justification if
it continued to condone male circumcision and at the same time
chose to bring charges against the parents of girls who are symboli-
cally circumcised.207
Given the close similarity of Harborview’s proposed cutting of
girls and male circumcision, the sole justification for prohibiting the
cutting of girls while allowing the cutting of boys would be if symbolic
female circumcision harms girls (and eventually women) in a way
that male circumcision does not harm boys.208  For example, one
205. The consent issue could go either way.  It is unclear whether any eleven-year-old child,
still very much under the influence of her parents, can give independent consent.  If independ-
ent consent at this age is impossible, or unlikely, then it is a fiction to say that any consent that
is eventually obtained is valid.  Indeed, consent obtained under these circumstances might en-
hance the emotional injury because it might cause the child later to believe she had actively
contributed to her own circumcision.  On the other hand, making the child part of the decision
making process even at this early age may well give her the feeling of responsibility and iden-
tity she needed to accept her parents’—and perhaps now her—tradition.
206. Professor Obiora appears to suggest that “clinicalization” of the traditional sunna cir-
cumcision—the form that involves “only” the removal of the hood or prepuce of the clitoris
and thus, according to Obiora, is “most comparable to male circumcision”—may be an appro-
priate solution to the international conflict over female circumcision.  See Obiora, supra note
17, at 289 (making comparison between sunna form of female circumcision and traditional
male circumcision); id. at 365-76 (making the clinicalization argument).  Implicit in this is the
notion that for equal protection purposes, one does not need to do what I am suggesting, i.e., to
“reduce” the circumcision to its symbolic form.  Although Obiora’s approach goes far in recog-
nizing the need to address the child abuse argument and the legal implications of equal protec-
tion doctrine, I believe that the doctrine demands more comprehensive equivalence.  The long-
term ramifications of removing male and female foreskin are likely to be quite different.  We
know, for example, that circumcised males can and do live perfectly normal lives—including
sexual lives.  We do not have this same information in the case of circumcised women.  Indeed,
the clitoris is such a sensitive part of the female anatomy that it is likely that if its protective
hood or prepuce was removed, the opposite would be true.  Clinicalization at the time the pro-
cedure is done simply cannot cure this deficiency.
207. This is, of course, a hypothetical question, since the symbolic procedure was never per-
formed, at least at Harborview.
208. This argument is hotly contested by men’s groups who argue that male circumcision
should also be classified as child abuse, because it both causes emotional harm and is of dubi-
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might argue, as did Mimi Ramsey, that the symbolic circumcision of
girls is an enactment and reinforcement of female subordination, and
thus emotional child abuse,209 and rather than participating in gender-
based discrimination, the state, through its child abuse laws, is at-
tempting to control it.
There are several flaws in this argument which make it unlikely
that it could provide the requisite “exceedingly persuasive justifica-
tion” for the state’s discriminatory treatment of otherwise similarly-
situated boys and girls.210
First, it would be pure speculation to say that the symbolic cir-
cumcision likely would cause the sort of emotional suffering that
amounts to child abuse, particularly in this case where the procedure
was never performed. We simply do not know how a girl who was
subject to this procedure would react, and what other factors, in-
cluding other cultural forces in her life, would contribute to her emo-
tional state.  And while it is certainly possible that there might be
some emotional repercussions, it is equally possible that if the girl
believed that her parents had saved her from a worse fate, she would
be relieved that the procedure was performed.  Ultimately, there is
simply no way to know what the emotional impact of the symbolic
circumcision would be, and thus it would be illegitimate to base a de-
cision to discriminate against the potential beneficiaries of the proce-
dure on such pure speculation.
More importantly, even if Somali (and other) girls did suffer
emotionally as a result of their parents’ beliefs, the Supreme Court
under the First and Fourteenth Amendments has given wide latitude
ous medical benefit.  See, e.g., Edward Wallerstein, Circumcision: Ritual Surgery or Surgical
Ritual?, 2 MED. & L. 85, 90-92, 95-96 (1983) (noting the dispute among scholars regarding the
necessity and wisdom of practicing male circumcision); Kevin Starbuck, Perspective, Rights of
Infants, CHI. TRIB., July 8, 1993, at H18 (asserting that male circumcision is medically neces-
sary in less than one percent of cases in which it is performed).
209. Many states define child abuse to include acts causing emotional harm.  See, e.g., FLA.
STAT. ANN. § 39.01(2) (West 1988) (“‘Abuse’ means any willful act that results in any physical,
mental, or sexual injury that causes or is likely to cause the child’s . . . emotional health to be
significantly impaired.”); LA. CHILDREN’S CODE ANN. § 1003 (West 1995) (“‘Abuse’ means
any of the [enumerated] acts which seriously endanger the physical, mental, or emotional
health of the child . . . .”).
210. The argument I imagine the state making here—that the motivational difference be-
tween male and female circumcision, and the emotional suffering that female circumcision
might engender, provides an “exceedingly persuasive justification” for discriminatory treat-
ment—could also support the position that boys and girls were not in fact similarly-situated.
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to parents to raise their children as they see fit,211 and there is no ex-
ception to this doctrine for the purely private decision some parents
make to subordinate girls.  For example, parents are allowed to send
only their boys to college, to teach their girls that their place is in the
home, and to instruct their boys that they will be the “lords and mas-
211. The broad freedom that parents have to raise their children, even if their views lie out-
side the mainstream, is a well-ensconced feature of constitutional law.  The First Amendment
protects the exercise of religious traditions by parents in the upbringing of their children; inva-
sions of this right by the state must be justified by interests “of the highest order.”  Wisconsin v.
Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 215 (1972).  The Fourteenth Amendment protects the fundamental right
of “parental autonomy,” the interest of parents in retaining substantial control over how they
raise their children.  Limitation of this interest by the state must be justified by equally compel-
ling state interests.  See Parham v. J.R., 442 U.S. 584, 600 (1979) (balancing, in the context of a
dispute over voluntary commitment of children to mental hospitals, the interests of parents and
children against those of the state).  Thus, courts asked to rule on the role of parents in par-
ticular circumstances usually, if not always, begin their analysis with a passage much like this
one:
Our jurisprudence historically has reflected Western civilization concepts of
the family as a unit with broad parental authority over minor children.  Our cases
have consistently followed that course; our constitutional system long ago rejected
any notion that a child is “the mere creature of the State” and, on the contrary, as-
serted that parents generally “have the right, coupled with the high duty, to recog-
nize and prepare [their children] for additional obligations.”
Id. at 602 (alteration in original) (quoting Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510, 535 (1925)).
It is under the auspices of this doctrine that dissenting parents are permitted despite
compulsory school attendance laws to take their children out of school or to home school them,
see, e.g., Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 235-36 (1972) (allowing such removal where the
parents, members of the Amish religion, had otherwise demonstrated their commitment to an
orderly society).  For an exceptional argument that parental freedom not to adhere to compul-
sory school attendance laws and to conventional medical practices violates children’s right to
the equal protection of the laws, see James G. Dwyer, The Children We Abandon: Religious
Exemptions to Child Welfare and Education Laws as Denials of Equal Protection to Children of
Religious Objectors, 74 N.C. L. REV. 1321 (1996).
The philosophical origins of this doctrine lie in liberalism’s respect for the individual
adult and his (or her) right to be free from governmental intrusions:
Every family is a little state, or empire within itself . . . .
Every father is the constituted head and ruler of his household.  God has made
him the supreme earthly legislator over his children . . . amenable to no other power,
except in the most extreme cases of neglect, or abuse.  The will of the parent is the
law to which the child is bound in all cases to submit, unless it plainly contravenes the
law of God. . . .
Nor has civil government any right to interfere with the head of a family, un-
less it be where he is guilty of extreme neglect, or abuse.
HEMAN HUMPHREY, DOMESTIC EDUCATION (1840), reprinted in 1 CHILDREN AND YOUTH IN
AMERICA: A DOCUMENTARY HISTORY 351-52 (Robert Bremner ed., 1970); see also Lacher v.
Venus, 188 N.W. 613, 617 (Wis. 1922) (“A natural affection between the parent and off-
spring . . . has always been recognized as an inherent, natural right, for the protection of which,
just as much as for the protection of the rights of the individual to life, liberty and pursuit of
happiness, our government is formed.”).
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ters” of those homes. 212  Such private discrimination and the emo-
tional suffering that it may bring to girls have always fallen within the
realm of appropriate parental autonomy.  State action designed to in-
fringe on that autonomy—for example, as a result of a judgment that
the practice constituted child abuse—generally is found to be uncon-
stitutional.213  If discriminatory parenting practices are protected con-
stitutionally, it is difficult to see how eliminating these practices
would constitute an “exceedingly persuasive” reason to sanction or to
discriminate against certain (immigrant) parents and their similarly
patriarchal views on child-rearing.  Stated another way, the state’s
hypothesized justification would be inconsistent with parents’ relig-
ious and cultural autonomy rights under the First and Fourteenth
Amendments.214
Finally, the state may argue that even if it cannot prosecute
purely private cutting as child abuse—for example if the Somali par-
ents decided to perform the symbolic circumcision at home—it
should not be required to perform the procedure in public facilities.
While this position may have force in other contexts, it is critically
flawed here, again because the state has chosen to provide circumci-
sion services to parents of male children, and has done so without
also reaffirming the non-medical parental motivations underlying
that practice.  Specifically, when the state performs a circumcision at
a state facility at the request of Jews or Muslims, it has not chosen to
practice Judaism or Islam, nor has it adopted the religious and cul-
tural rationales that motivate these groups.  Rather, it merely recog-
nizes the procedure as a child-raising practice that does not transcend
the bounds of law.  What this somewhat vague conclusion means is
simply that our law permits quite a lot of individual freedom, includ-
ing the freedom of parents to raise their children in a patriarchal tra-
dition.215  In allowing this freedom, the state does not thereby adopt
patriarchy; rather, it merely affirms the country’s historical and philo-
sophical commitment to individual liberty.216
212. See generally supra note 211 (describing broad parental autonomy rights under the
First and Fourteenth Amendments).
213. See id.
214. As I described in Part II, the Somali parents at issue sincerely believe that their relig-
ion requires female circumcision “much as the Jewish faith does male circumcision.”  See supra
note 99 and accompanying text.
215. See supra notes 211-12 and accompanying text.
216. Of course, the individual liberty at issue in this context is that of the adult parents, as
this is all that the constitutional doctrine contemplates.  See supra note 211 (discussing philo-
sophical underpinnings of broad parental role).
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Ultimately, the state has no “exceedingly persuasive” reason for
any gender-based distinctions in the Harborview proposal.  And as a
consequence, because the proposal would not have violated federal
law, there is little doubt that the symbolic female circumcision would
have been lawful.217  Indeed, even if the proposal had violated federal
law, the foregoing equal protection analysis shows that its application
in this case likely would have been unconstitutional.  There is little
doubt, therefore, that Somali (or other similarly-situated) parents
who are refused the symbolic circumcision of their girls can claim
that the state is acting illegally.  In addition, to the extent that the
equal protection argument can be based on national origin or ethnic-
ity rather than gender,218 and that the hospital or medical facility at
issue receives federal funds, the parents also might have a federal
civil rights cause of action under Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of
1964.219
Given this conclusion, a state such as Washington has two op-
tions.  It can begin performing symbolic female circumcisions, or it
can stop circumcising or condoning the circumcision of boys.  While
the latter option would immediately raise substantial and very legiti-
mate First Amendment concerns for parents whose religion requires
circumcision—concerns that could be articulated just as easily by
parents of boys and girls—it is clear that the choice must be made
one way or the other.  The bottom line is that the state cannot treat
parents differently on the basis of their child’s gender.
IV.  THE MERITS OF THE COMPROMISE
Assuming the legality of the Harborview proposal, the policy
question remains: Should the proposal have been carried out?  An-
swering this question requires serious consideration of the views of its
opponents, as well as those of its proponents.  It also requires some
217. It bears repeating that this legal conclusion is only viable if the symbolic circumcision
at issue is less invasive than or at most a relative equivalent to male circumcision.  Thus, I am
not arguing (and do not believe) that any traditional form of FGM could be viewed as an
equivalent to male circumcision.
218. See supra note 186 (describing both the equal protection test and this ethnicity argu-
ment).
219. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000d (1994) (prohibiting exclusion from participation in, denial of
benefits of, and discrimination under, federally-assisted programs on grounds of race, color, or
national origin); cf. cases cited supra note 186 (noting that an equal protection challenge on the
grounds of ethnicity or national origin also may be viable in the context of symbolic FGM re-
strictions).
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further exploration of the merits of pragmatism in the consideration
of cultural collisions, particularly those that implicate religious be-
liefs, and of the importance to American society of achieving the
proper balance between multicultural sensitivity and the need for so-
cial order.
Opponents identified three problems with Harborview’s pro-
posal to perform symbolic female circumcisions.  The first and, in my
view, most weighty, is that performing this procedure would have
sanctioned medically-unnecessary physical injury to children.220  The
second, often voiced by opponents of FGM, is that “even talking
about cutting female genitals legitimizes a barbaric practice, one that
disempowers women and serves to keep them out of the American
mainstream.”221  The third, related criticism of Harborview’s proposal
is that it seems to defeat the process of Americanization.  I will ad-
dress the merits of each of these quite legitimate concerns in turn.
Typically, medically unnecessary injury to a child is considered
child abuse in jurisdictions across the United States.222  These laws ac-
curately reflect society’s view that children should purposefully be
injured only in those circumstances where it is necessary to preserve
their health, and then only by a trained medical provider.  So strongly
held is this view, in fact, that its traditional exceptions, including
“reasonable” corporal punishment and male circumcision, are today
being reexamined as more and more modern experts in child devel-
opment and medicine question the appropriateness of even these
long accepted forms of injury.223
In this evolving cultural context, the notion that we would volun-
tarily add to the list of socially accepted but medically unnecessary
220. See Boulware-Miller, supra note 17, at 165-69 (discussing policy and personal implica-
tions of characterizing FGM as child abuse); see also supra text accompanying note 118.
221. Ostrom, supra note 81.
222. See supra note 170 (describing typical child abuse statutes).
223. The propriety of routine male circumcision is very much at issue in the medical com-
munity today.  See Goodnow, supra note 185 (discussing the current context of the debate).
The same is true of corporal punishment, although contemporary child specialists appear to be
more unified in the view that physical punishment is not appropriate.  See T. BERRY
BRAZELTON, M.D., TOUCHPOINTS 260 (1992) (stating that physical punishment has disadvan-
tages such as telling the child “you believe in power and physical aggression” and suggesting
other forms of discipline, such as “time out”).  The movement against corporal punishment is
especially strong internationally.  See Susan Kilbourne, U.S. Failure to Ratify the U.N. Conven-
tion on the Rights of the Child: Playing Politics with Children’s Rights, 6 TRANSNAT’L L. &
CONTEMP. PROBS. 437, 450-51 (1996) (noting that Article 19 of the U.N. Convention has been
interpreted both by the treaty’s managing committee and by some of its proponents and oppo-
nents as prohibiting corporal punishment).
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injuries makes little sense.224  Indeed, it is anachronistic at best that
we would consciously add female genital “cutting” to the list of con-
doned injuries at the same time we are busy whittling down that list.
Pat Schroeder seemed especially perturbed by this contradiction
when she wrote to Harborview that she was “baffle[d] and horri-
fie[d]” when she heard of the proposal to perform symbolic circumci-
sions, since, in her mind, “[t]he clear intent of the [federal] legisla-
tion . . . was to criminalize any medically unnecessary procedure
involving female genitalia.”225
This view would be quite persuasive, except for two important
considerations.  First, it necessarily assumes that if the symbolic cir-
cumcision is not performed, the girls at issue will not be physically
injured.  In fact, we know that the opposite is probably true.  The
immigrants and refugees told Harborview that both their culture and
their religion mandate a form of the traditional practice.  They also
insisted that if the hospital did not perform the procedure, they
would send their daughters to one of three local midwives, each of
whom has a different idea of what a sunna circumcision is.226  If the
midwives were unable to cut the girls, the parents were clear that
“they would pay the $1,500 fare to fly their daughters to their home-
land, where they would face the extreme version of the cutting rit-
ual.”227  Assuming these claims are true, the question Harborview
faced was not whether to injure a child.  Either way, the girls would
be injured.  And thus, the issue presented was a most practical one:
Do we allow for the reality that the child will likely be cut by a mid-
wife in the traditional fashion, or do we afford her the possibility of a
224. It makes even less sense when one considers that this same society has only recently
abandoned all but one form of female genital “surgery.”  See Telephone Interview with Dr.
Leslie Miller, supra note 64 (discussing role of a plastic surgeon on Harborview’s review com-
mittee, and the fact that that specialization currently performs surgery on the genitalia of fe-
male adolescents in the United States); see also Ben Barker-Benfield, Sexual Surgery in Late
Nineteenth Century America, 5 INT’L J. HEALTH SERVICES 279 (1975) (discussing historical
practice of FGM in the U.S.)
225. Schroeder Letter to LoGerfo, supra note 116, at 1.  It is unclear either from her letter
or from the legislative history of the federal statute whether Schroeder was aware of the cos-
metic procedure.  Either she was aware of its existence, and she believed it could be classified
as medically necessary, or she was not aware of the procedure, and risked criminalizing it.
226. Telephone Interview with Dr. Leslie Miller, supra note 64; see also supra text accom-
panying note 80.
227. Brune, supra note 1; see also Burstyn, supra note 83, at 30 (discussing basis for believ-
ing the immigrants were and are committed to this enormous expense).
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symbolic incision made by a trained medical professional at an age
where she could presumably have some voice?228
This question, I believe, can have only one answer in the discus-
sion about child abuse.  Let me be clear: No abuse is better than even
a little abuse.  And if this were the real choice, then the answer would
be equally clear.  We could not condone the procedure.  But here, the
real choice is between the evil of FGM and the lesser evil of a sym-
bolic cut.229  In graphic terms, it is a choice between having your
mother hold you down while your clitoris is cut off by an untrained
midwife with rough tools and no anesthesia, and consenting (or not)
when you are eleven to having a doctor at a hospital make a small,
symbolic incision on the hood of your clitoris under some form of an-
esthesia.230  Assuming there was nothing else at stake, all of us would
subject ourselves and our children to the lesser of these two scenar-
228. In response to comments that the hospital’s proposal would take away the girls’ right
to be free from any form of physical abuse, Dr. James LoGerfo, Harborview’s Medical Direc-
tor, commented that this view was naive: “the compromise [procedure],” he stated, “may be the
only available ethical, legal and humane alternative ‘short of throwing the kids and the mother
in jail for 20 years to make sure nothing happens to them.’” Ostrom, supra note 81.
229. As I have already discussed, the concept of FGM as “evil” is certainly not universally
shared.  See supra note 27; see also Boulware-Miller, supra note 17, at 157-58 (relating the so-
cial and economic benefits that accompany FGM); Obiora, supra note 17, at 295-98 (noting
positive aspects of the practice in the cultural contexts in which it is performed); cf. id. at 367
(characterizing “sanitization,” or medicalization of FGM, as “the lesser of two evils” for practi-
tioners of FGM, the greater evil in her view being an uninformed push for abolition).  Indeed,
it appears to be the case that most African women confronted with the choice whether or not to
circumcise their daughters balance the physical harm to the child against the social and eco-
nomic benefits that come from the procedure, and generally (and in their cultural context logi-
cally) decide that the latter outweigh the former.  See Boulware-Miller, supra note 17, at 165-
69.  Thus, this judgment that I have made that FGM is “evil” is a particularly Western (and
some would say “arrogant” or “imperialist”) one.  See supra notes 29, 55.  This perspective in
some respects also might be considered unhelpful.  See supra note 27 (noting how the Western
perspective of  FGM is resented by even the African women who are trying to halt its practice).
Nevertheless, I make the judgment and dare to be an imperialist in the context of a discussion
of the cultural rights immigrants have in a Western country.  Despite the views of some cultural
relativists and multiculturalists, such imperialism in the domestic context is not inappropriate;
indeed, as I stated earlier, to call it imperialism in this context is entirely inapposite.  See supra
note 55.  As a practical matter, the situation of girls facing FGM in the United States is not the
same as it would have been in their own countries; for example, if they are not circumcised
here, they are not necessarily unmarriageable and certainly not categorically deprived of eco-
nomic opportunities.  Thus, the more positive rationales for the traditional practice as it takes
place in Africa or Asia no longer have measurable force, and what we are left with is primarily
physical harm to a child.
230. As I have already noted above, the question whether the girl’s consent would be truly
informed and voluntary can be debated.  See supra note 205.  Suffice it to say that even if it
were impossible to obtain informed and voluntary consent from an eleven-year-old, this sce-
nario would be better than the alternative.
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ios.  The Harborview proposal was not equivalent to Sophie’s Choice,
where the proposed options were equivalently evil, and thus the ethi-
cal selection was to make no selection at all.231  As a result, to talk at
this juncture of theory or the message the practice would send to so-
ciety, is both inapposite and inappropriate to the very stark circum-
stances some little girls are facing.
Indeed, the fact that Somalis might be more likely to circumcise
their girls in the United States than in their home country, because
American culture is seen as allowing the very promiscuity the prac-
tice is intended to eradicate, highlights that the West cannot simply
assume that the refugees and immigrants will agree to stop the prac-
tice because they are now “in Rome.”  Short of changing what these
immigrants view as our culture of promiscuity, the United States
must appreciate and address the legitimacy of this traditional con-
cern—a concern shared, ironically, by many indigenous conservatives
in our society—and develop, in addition to legal proscriptions, practi-
cal ways to protect the little girls in jeopardy.232
The second consideration that makes the child abuse attack on
Harborview’s proposal less persuasive is that it is being applied une-
qually to girls and boys.  As I discussed in Part III, permitting male
circumcision while disallowing this symbolic form of female circumci-
sion likely would violate the Equal Protection Clause.  But even if
this constitutional prohibition were not implicated, there still would
be the moral question of how to justify abusing boys but not girls.  Ei-
ther our society wants to eradicate all forms of non-accidental inju-
ries to children, or it wants to continue to allow for such injuries un-
der certain circumstances.  But if the latter is the predominant view—
and it may well be—it is anathema to other societal values to define
the permissible injuries on the basis of gender.  Religion or health-
based motivations are condoned in general, but gender-based motiva-
tions are not.  Thus, as I concluded earlier, if the child abuse argu-
ment is used against Harborview’s proposal, it works only so long as
society also is willing to address the issue of male circumcision.
231. See WILLIAM STYRON, SOPHIE’S CHOICE 483-84 (1979) (relating how a Nazi concen-
tration camp guard gave Sophie, an inmate, the “choice” of selecting which one of her children
lived and which one died).
232. Cf. Boulware-Miller, supra note 17, at 169-72 (noting that the traditional Western ar-
gument against FGM—that it denies women the “right to sexual and corporal integrity”—is not
one which is persuasive to affected women who often prefer the social and economic benefits
attendant to the procedure).
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Because that day is not yet at hand, and because the proposal
would have prevented severe physical and psychological injuries
rather than perpetrated them, there is little doubt that the child abuse
argument against Harborview’s proposal fails.  To the contrary, this
very analysis reveals the wisdom of the proposal: It would have
solved the practical problem opponents of FGM have failed to solve,
namely, how to stop that traditional practice and actually prevent
mutilations.  And it would have addressed the theoretical critique of
cultural relativists and practitioners of FGM that Western opponents
of the practice are hypocritical given their acceptance of male cir-
cumcision.  In this latter regard, not only does the symbolic circumci-
sion proposed by Harborview reflect a lack of hypocrisy, but it also
demonstrates that to make female circumcision relatively equivalent
to male circumcision, the former has to be altered to the extent sug-
gested by the Harborview compromise.
As I suggested in the introduction to this Part, however, there
are other problems with Harborview’s proposal that must be consid-
ered.  The second problem, most strongly supported by feminist op-
ponents of FGM, is that the proposal would have sent the wrong
message to society and to immigrants about the willingness of Ameri-
can culture to accept FGM and its underlying patriarchal philoso-
phy.233  As Ramsey noted when she heard of Harborview’s plans,
“[w]hat the Somalis, what the immigrants like me need is an educa-
tion, not sensitivity to culture.”234  This view certainly has merit.  A
willingness openly to discuss discrimination against cultural minori-
ties (including women) in positive tones can lend vitality to those
forces that would engage in or perpetuate the discrimination.  And to
the extent that FGM itself has the potential to cause real harm to its
victims, such discussions may be harmful. Indeed, I agree with Ram-
sey that we should not encourage practitioners of FGM to believe
that the United States is open to their underlying views about
women’s sexuality and the role of girls and women in the society.
233. See Ostrom, supra note 81 (noting that the mere discussion of symbolically cutting fe-
male genitalia serves to subjugate women).  Although Schroeder joined in the opposition, see
Dugger, supra note 18, Mimi Ramsey was the principal voice for this argument in the context
of the Harborview proposal.  See Brune, supra note 1; Ostrom, supra note 81.  A Dutch pro-
posal to perform a similar symbolic circumcision drew a nearly identical reaction from Berhane
Ras-Work, the Ethiopian Chair of the Inter-African Committee.  See Obiora, supra note 17, at
285.  Ras-Work’s view was that the official approval of symbolic incisions would “set a danger-
ous precedent, reconfirming the subjugation of women.”  Id.  Obiora believes that this response
“is somewhat misconceived and over-broad.”  Id. at 285-86.
234. Brune, supra note 1 (internal quotation marks omitted).
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The flaw in this opposition to Harborview’s proposal does not lie
in a recognition of the dangers of talking openly and positively about
FGM, but in the fact that it also would censor and eventually kill po-
tentially effective discussion about how to limit and ultimately to stop
the practice of FGM.  This unfortunate outcome, in fact, is precisely
what happened in the Harborview case.  Schroeder, Ramsey, and
others who were “horrified,” “baffled” and otherwise outraged that
the hospital was “even talking about” a compromise on the circumci-
sion question235 cloaked their outrage in the language of a purported
higher morality, and managed, as a result, quickly and cleanly to stop
the Harborview proposal.  Empirical evidence demonstrates, how-
ever, that their message—ensconced in the federal and state statutes
prohibiting FGM—is not broadly effective in the relevant communi-
ties.
Immigrants who believe, either for religious or cultural reasons,
that their daughters must be circumcised apparently are not deterred
by the law or the majority culture’s dictates.  The report in the Seattle
Times that Harborview’s patients “would pay the $1,500 fare to fly
their daughters to their homeland”236 if necessary is but one of many
examples where immigrants have insisted that Western legal and cul-
tural opposition to a traditional practice would not affect their be-
havior.237  As I have stated elsewhere, both the law and the punish-
ment it imposes serve an important educational function.238
Nonetheless, in the case of FGM, it is in spite of the law that, as I
write this Article and as we debate the power of messages, it is said
that little girls are being “operated” upon on United States soil.239 If
the goal is to protect those little girls, it is both imprudent and unre-
alistic to rely exclusively on messages, however important they oth-
erwise may be.
235. Ostrom, supra note 81.
236. Brune, supra note 1.
237. See Dugger, supra note 18 (describing a Somali refugee couple living in Houston who
already have had one daughter circumcised and who intend to do the same with their other
daughter); Ostrom, supra note 81 (describing a Somali woman living in Seattle who said the
procedure was necessary to “help her daughters avoid what she sees as the American disease”).
238. For example, both the guilt and sentencing aspects of criminal law are designed to
serve the purposes of general deterrence, specific deterrence, and education.  See Coleman,
supra note 3, at 1128.  As such, the law is specifically intended “to assure that the individual
criminal, and sometimes those with the potential for criminal behavior, are discouraged from
engaging in such conduct in the future.”  Id.
239. See Burstyn, supra note 83, at 33.
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The other point that needs to be made about messages is that
even if the Harborview compromise sends a negative message about
American society’s willingness to tolerate the patriarchal notions that
underlie FGM, it is certainly an attenuated one.  The hospital cate-
gorically refused to consider any form of traditional female circumci-
sion.240  It proposed the symbolic circumcision because it reasonably
believed this procedure was the only way to protect the little girls
who otherwise would be mutilated.  As Harborview’s spokesperson
said, the hospital’s intent was “to provide a relatively safe procedure
to a population of young women who traditionally have had some
horrendous things done to them.”241  Given this quite public rejection
of FGM, it is difficult to view the hospital’s message—accurately pre-
sented—as terribly threatening.  The fact that many apparently did
not hear it accurately, because influential individuals created and
perpetuated the false impression that Harborview actually was plan-
ning to circumcise girls, only goes to show how tricky reliance on
messages can be.
On the other hand, Harborview’s compromise with its patients
might have sent positive messages about the need for immigrant
communities to understand the limits of our society’s tolerance for
certain practices (in this context, the traditional forms of FGM), and
at the same time its ability to engage in pragmatic discussions to re-
solve cultural collisions that implicate issues of great significance for
immigrant communities as well as the larger community as a whole.
The hospital’s insistence that it would not even consider performing
any of the traditional forms of FGM should have sent the clear mes-
sage that neither it nor the society was willing to tolerate any tradi-
tional form of this practice.  This message was received at least by
those Somalis who agreed to the modest compromise.  In addition,
the hospital’s recognition of the need to develop a practical solution
to the problem also should have sent a positive message about the
ability and willingness of the majority culture to be sensitive to and
understanding of the power of cultural and religious difference.  That
the viability of these messages was severely damaged by misleading
newspaper articles and commentary from opponents of the compro-
mise does not, of course, mean that the messages were not there, just
that they were embedded in negative rhetoric that should have been
discarded.
240. See supra notes 79, 104, 109-10, 139 and accompanying text.
241. Brune, supra note 1.
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The third, related attack on Harborview’s proposal, which does
not appear to have been articulated explicitly, is that it interfered
with the process of “Americanization.”242 “Americanization” was re-
cently defined by the United States Commission on Immigration Re-
form as “the process of integration by which immigrants become part
of our communities . . . [including] the civic incorporation of immi-
grants, that is the cultivation of a shared commitment to the Ameri-
can values of liberty, democracy, and equal opportunity.”243  The
Americanization argument against the Harborview proposal is that in
allowing for even a symbolic form of female circumcision, the hospi-
242. “Americanization” may be defined as the process of becoming American or
“Americanized.”  See, e.g., THE AMERICAN HERITAGE DICTIONARY 60 (3d ed. 1992) (defining
“Americanize” as “to assimilate into American culture. . . . To become American, as in spirit”);
WEBSTER’S NEW WORLD DICTIONARY 44 (3d C. ed. 1988) (listing among the definitions of
“Americanize” “to make or become American in character, manners, methods, ideals, etc.;
assimilate to U.S. customs”).
In the legal literature, the words “Americanize” and “Americanization” are most often
used in connection with immigrants; specifically, this term usually refers to the process of
learning the English language and American cultural behaviors.  See, e.g., Glen O. Robinson,
Communities, 83 VA. L. REV. 269, 328 (1997) (stating that “the compulsory public education
law in Pierce [v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510 (1925)] was part of a strategy designed to
‘Americanize’ the schools by requiring teacher loyalty oaths and by banning the teaching of
evolution and foreign languages, among other things”); Frank Sullivan, Jr., Indiana as a Fore-
runner in the Juvenile Court Movement, 30 IND. L. REV. 279, 302 (1997) (“There was an effort
[in the mid-nineteenth century] to Americanize ethnic children by separating them from their
families and giving them a segregated education” (quoting Roger Rosenblatt, Essay on The
News Hour with Jim Lehrer (PBS television broadcast, Feb. 12, 1996))); Michael DiChiara,
Note, A Modern Day Myth: The Necessity of English as the Official Language, 17 B.C. THIRD
WORLD L.J. 101, 103 (1997) (“In the early 1900’s, English literacy requirements were imposed
as conditions for naturalization and suffrage in order to Americanize immigrants.”).
The term “Americanization” itself is controversial.  Some believe that it accurately,
poignantly, and with utmost good will describes the process of acculturating immigrants.  Like
Barbara Jordan, they believe that although the “‘word earned a bad reputation when it was
stolen by racists and xenophobes in the 1920s. . . .  [I]t is our word, and we are taking it back.’”
U.S. COMM’N ON IMMIGRATION REFORM, supra note 8, at 6 (quoting a public speech given by
Barbara Jordan in 1995).  Others believe that conservative anti-immigration forces stole the
word forever, and thus that it cannot be resuscitated in any useful—i.e., non-racist—sense.
Even when viewed in the best light as defining “the process of integration by which immigrants
become part of our communities and by which . . . the nation learn[s] from and adapt[s] to their
presence,” U.S. COMM’N ON IMMIGRATION REFORM, supra note 8, at 6, the term necessarily
begs loaded questions including, acculturation into what and just how much acculturation do
we require?
I use the word in this Article understanding the importance of this debate and the legiti-
macy of these questions.  I use it because I agree with Barbara Jordan and her ideological col-
leagues that racists should not be permitted forever to co-opt the national name.  And I use it
expecting to give some answers to the questions begged by its definition.  See infra notes 259-67
and accompanying text.
243. U.S. COMM’N ON IMMIGRATION REFORM, supra note 8, at 6.
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tal seemed to recognize the continued vitality of an immigrant tradi-
tional practice that was clearly contrary to progressive tenets of
American culture.244  If some immigrants took this message from the
proposal, they may falsely believe that American culture is tolerant
enough to include the practice and its patriarchal underpinnings.
And since Americanization involves assimilation by immigrants into
at least the core aspects of the majority culture, the proposal ap-
peared to retard that process.
As the failure of the anti-FGM laws actually to curb the practice
demonstrates, however, how best to Americanize immigrants is by no
means a simple matter.  On the contrary, these questions have long
been a subject of national significance and national controversy.245
Our extensive history with Americanization, however, provides some
empirical lessons.  For example, it is accepted that there will be a
transition period from the first to the second generation, during
which the immigrant family assimilates into American culture.246  We
244. I recognize, of course, that this argument begs the ultimate questions what is
“American culture” and what are its “tenets.”  While a full exploration of this question is be-
yond the scope of this Article, I do set out my views in general at the end of this section.  See
infra notes 259-67 and accompanying text.  I also have stated elsewhere that at least in the con-
text of immigrant cultural practices like FGM, the position of American culture is clear and its
tenets are equally so.  See Coleman, supra note 3, at 1166 (describing progressive American
culture as including both an antidiscrimination principle and a respect for women and children,
which together do not permit violence directed specifically at those groups, and expressly re-
jecting the view that multiculturalism as a progressive cultural tenet can overcome these prin-
ciples).  Finally, I believe that we arrive at least piecemeal at some conclusions about the con-
tent of American culture when we address comprehensively cultural collisions of the sort this
Article describes.
245. See generally EDWARD GEORGE HARTMANN, THE MOVEMENT TO AMERICANIZE
THE IMMIGRANT (1948) (describing this historic movement and controversy).
246. Margaret Talbot makes this point in her writing on immigrant cultural collisions for
the New Republic.  See Margaret Talbot, Baghdad on the Plains, NEW REPUBLIC, Aug. 11-18,
1997, at 18, 20.  She writes that American history is replete with examples of instances in which
immigrant groups have sought, explicitly or in practice, transition periods in the Americaniza-
tion process.  See id.  Often, if not always, the immigrant community in which the particular
individual finds himself or herself provides the vehicle for transition.  See id.  In addition, and
perhaps surprisingly, allowance for this period of transition seems to enhance the immigrant’s
chances of successful assimilation and his or her ultimate loyalty to American culture:
[I]nstitutions[, such as] Yiddish newspapers, the German schools, the Scandinavian
churches[,] have always played a vital part in assimilating immigrants, softening and
making sense of the transition to American life.
. . . .
Immigrant enclaves have been like comfort stations on the road to assimila-
tion, the places where you learned from your own kind about the new kind you were
bound to become.  “Indeed,” writes John Gjerde[,] . . . “a political environment that
permitted immigrants to maintain their religious beliefs and converse in their home
language worked to augment loyalties to the American nation.  Newspapers and
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also know that acculturation is often non-existent in older or more
conservative members of the first generation, while the rate of as-
similation among younger members or members who have more to
gain from the process is more rapid.247  In any event, there generally is
little (and often no) doubt that the children of immigrants will
Americanize.248  And while experts have demonstrated differences in
the acculturation rates and abilities of various immigrant groups de-
pending upon their educational and professional backgrounds and
where they settle,249 the process of assimilation is also generally un-
printed tracts instructed non-English speakers in the precepts, responsibilities, and
rights inherent in the Republic.”
. . . [S]elf-contained immigrant communities coexisted with a generalized faith
in what Peter Salins has called the assimilation contract—the idea that in exchange
for tacit permission to retain much of their own culture, especially in the short term,
immigrants would sign on to a kind of long-term project of Americanization.
Id.
247. See, e.g., THE KOREAN DIASPORA: HISTORICAL AND SOCIOLOGICAL STUDIES OF
KOREAN IMMIGRATION AND ASSIMILATION IN NORTH AMERICA 171 (Hyung-Chan Kim ed.,
1977) (noting that a “young age at the time of entering the United States was expected to con-
tribute to greater assimilation, since the young are thought to adapt more quickly to a new cul-
ture”); Anh T. Lam, Culture as a Defense: Preventing Judicial Bias Against Asians and Pacific
Islanders, 1 UCLA ASIAN AM. PAC. ISLANDS L.J. 49, 61 (1993) (“The Vietnamese husband
traditionally is regarded as the strongest person in the household, the master and religious head
of the family. . . . [In these households, there are] ‘differential rates of acculturation [to Ameri-
can society] in husbands and wives, with rapid change likely in the latter’s case.’”).
248. See HING, supra note 6, at 152-54 (describing generally immigrants’ assimilation pat-
terns through the third generation).  Professor Hing notes that despite anti-immigrant rhetoric
to the contrary, immigrants from all countries do assimilate or Americanize:
Study after study demonstrates . . . that the vast majority of immigrants take
on cultural traits of the host community.  Some traits replace old ones, but most are
simply added.  For example, immigrants entering the United States today learn Eng-
lish at the same rate as other immigrant groups before them.  First-generation immi-
grants tend to learn English and pass it along to their children, who become bilin-
gual.  Immigrants want and encourage their children to learn English.  By the third
generation, the original language is often lost.
 . . . Many young Asian and Latino immigrants, in particular, aggressively
strive to become “American.”  They are eager to learn English, to get a job, to work
hard; in short they seek to achieve a part of the American dream. . . . Due to school
attendance, interaction with peers, and exposure to the media, the children of immi-
grants, even foreign-born children, generally become fully acculturated.
Id. at 153 (footnotes omitted).
Importantly, these generalizations are true for both non-European immigrants and
European immigrants.  See id.; ALEJANDRO PORTES & RUBÉN G. RUMBAUT, IMMIGRANT
AMERICA 217-19 (1990) (including a chart describing linguistic assimilation—a marker for cul-
tural assimilation generally—in second generation of workers, entrepreneurs, and profession-
als).
249. See PORTES & RUMBAUT, supra note 248, at 217-19 (noting different acculturation
rates depending upon whether the immigrant is a worker, entrepreneur, or professional,
whether the immigrant initially settles in an ethnic neighborhood or is “dispersed” among the
general population, and whether the immigrant is first or second generation).
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derstood as just that, a process.250  Immigrants do not become cultur-
ally American simply by virtue of their presence on United States
soil.
This last fact makes the acculturation process, or transition pe-
riod between arrival and Americanization, a very critical one.  Spe-
cifically, it is important not only that the process be recognized as
necessary and inevitable, but also as worthy of consideration.251
Therefore, in addition to clarifying what is legal and what is illegal,
we must also ask “What is the best way to Americanize immigrants?”
This question is precisely the one which Harborview and its patients
attempted to answer.  Implicit in their effort was the pragmatic rec-
ognition that they were together facing the process of acculturation.
Indeed, the hospital,252 the Somali immigrant community,253 and at
least a few others254 saw the symbolic circumcision as a way to protect
250. See U.S. COMM’N ON IMMIGRATION REFORM, supra note 8, at 6 (“Americanization is
the process of integration by which immigrants become part of our communities.” (emphasis
added)).
251. The U.S. Commission on Immigration Reform was designed, in part, to consider how
best to assure the success of the Americanization process.  Included in its recommendations are
suggestions that Congress assure the orientation, education, and naturalization of immigrants.
See id. at 8-16.
252. Telephone Interview with Dr. Leslie Miller, supra note 64 (noting that the hospital had
the hope and expectation that the procedure would be a transitional measure that would ulti-
mately lead to the complete abolition of the practice in the second generation); see also Os-
trom, supra note 81 (describing Dr. Miller’s view that symbolic circumcision “would help make
the transition from the generation with radical circumcisions to one where no cutting at all
would need to be done”).
253. The immigrant community’s perspective was explained by the Executive Director of
the Somali group, Afrirelief and Development:
I think the prevailing concept about it [female genital mutilation] is that it
should be diminished as much as possible, and possibly eradicated as far as girls are
concerned. . . . [However,] the fact that we came as refugees doesn’t mean we are
going to leave our culture overnight.  The bad parts of our culture we will try to
shake off, gradually.  Now we are at a point as leaders and elders of the community
negotiating with mothers.
Brune, supra note 1.  Brune notes that the larger immigrant community feels “the practice
should be ended.”  Id.  Nevertheless, community leaders are sensitive to the concerns of the
recent arrivals.  For example, as the Executive Director of Afrirelief and Development noted,
[y]ou cannot take away the rights of families and women . . . .  As leaders and elders
of the community we cannot force a mother to accept the general idea of the [larger
Somali immigrant] community [that circumcision should be eradicated].  She can say,
“I want my girl to have letting of blood.”
Id.
254. For example, one woman from the general community is reported to have said that:
While I share with those who are opposed to even this modified procedure the
belief that no girl should have to be physically altered in order to make her accept-
able, I also encourage them to support this compromise in a spirit of respect and pos-
sibly as being necessary during a generation of transition.
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little girls of recent refugees and immigrants who had not yet Ameri-
canized, and as a transitional measure between first and second gen-
eration Somalis.  As such, their vision was entirely consistent with
everything we know about how immigrants actually acculturate.255
Indeed, by combining contemporary American culture’s convictions
against FGM with an understanding of the need for multicultural
sensitivity during the period of Americanization, the hospital and its
immigrant patients managed to work out a very real (perhaps the
first real) solution to the problem of FGM in the United States.
Such pragmatism is essential in a field inundated from all sides
with rhetoric about ethnocentrism, universal values, the sanctity of
American culture, multiculturalism, and cultural relativism.256  What-
ever the philosophical views of those involved in the discussion, the
fact is that traditional practices like FGM will not be tolerated in the
United States or in other Western countries that share this country’s
views on customs that do not conform to majority culture.  Coming to
terms with that (ethnocentric) reality and the equally powerful truism
that some immigrant traditions cannot be eradicated simply by telling
the immigrants that they are illegal or contrary to American culture257
is a critical part of the effort to change those practices.258
I recognize, of course, that the theoretical and perhaps even
practical merits of this discussion about Americanization necessarily
rest upon society’s acceptance of the concept itself.  That is, we can
agree on the need for the symbolic procedure as a vehicle eventually
to eliminate FGM only if we first agree that immigrants should as-
similate into an American culture (which does not allow the tradi-
tional practice).  This, in turn, requires that we reject the merits of a
pure multicultural society259 that would allow for such non-
Elaine Ellinger Barrick, Letter to the Editor, Cultural Issues in Health Care—Circumcision
Compromise Good Transitional Response, SEATTLE TIMES, Sept. 22, 1996, at B11.
255. See supra notes 246-50 and accompanying text (describing the acculturation process
generally).
256. See Obiora, supra note 17, at 286 (arguing that pragmatism such as that demonstrated
by the Dutch proposal to perform symbolic circumcision is essential “to transform the manner
and health consequences of the surgeries”).
257. Brune, supra note 1.
258. This is not to say that philosophy is not important, or that discussions along those lines
are not helpful, at least to ensure that all of the parties involved understand their opponents’
perspectives.  For example, cultural relativists have certainly influenced many involved in this
area to be more sensitive, and at the same time to be wary of irrational ethnocentrism.  On the
other hand, these debates do little on their own to resolve anything.
259. As I have stated previously, multiculturalism involves
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conforming traditional practices, and that we share some common
understanding of what is meant by “American culture.”  The latter
requirement is the subject of a sometimes acrimonious national de-
bate,260 but I suggest that when we cast off extremist views from the
left and the right,261 the real discussion centers not on the question
whether we need or should have “one nation” with a “national cul-
ture,” but rather, what are the outlines and contents of that national
culture.262
aspiring toward “a plurality of cultures with [all] members [of society] seeking to live
together in amity and mutual understanding with mutual cooperation, but maintain-
ing separate cultures.” In its purest incarnation, multiculturalism is premised upon
the belief that all cultures are of equal value, that no one culture is better than an-
other.  Professor Stanley Fish describes adherents of this school as “strong multicul-
turalists” who “want to accord a deep respect to all cultures at their core.”  Professor
Fish contrasts “strong multiculturalism” with “boutique multicultualism,” whose ad-
herents “‘admire’ or ‘appreciate’ or ‘enjoy’ or ‘sympathize with’ or (at the very most)
‘recognize the legitimacy of’ the traditions of cultures other than their own.”
Coleman, supra note 3, at 1119 (citations omitted).  Thus, a pure multicultural society would be
one in which the different cultural traditions of its members were not subject to judgment from
the majority (or even other minority cultures).  Applied specifically to FGM, such a society
would not condemn the practice; it certainly would not make it illegal; and it would not work to
acculturate its adherents differently.
260. Compare GEORGIE ANNE GEYER, AMERICANS NO MORE: THE DEATH OF
CITIZENSHIP 55 (1996) (“[T]here is a real possibility that the idea and practice of citizenship in
America may for all intents and purposes die . . . .”), and J. HARVIE WILKINSON, III, ONE
NATION INDIVISIBLE: HOW ETHNIC SEPARATISM THREATENS AMERICA 171 (1997) (arguing
that shared language “enables Americans to interact as one nation rather than as a collectivity
of enclaves”), with HING, supra note 6, at 6-12 (arguing that immigrants contribute to an
evolving American culture), and LIND, supra note 10, at 14-15 (arguing that American society
is not threatened by real racial Balkanization, and we can still achieve a “color-blind society, in
which cultural fusion is accompanied . . . by racial amalgamation”).
261. That there are extremists on both sides of the debate—racists and separatists—is be-
yond dispute.  See HING, supra note 6, at 161 (positing conservative commentator Pat Bucha-
nan on one side of this divide and multicultural separatists on the other); see also id. at 180
(noting that these extremist positions cannot ultimately prevail because it is a fact that Ameri-
can society already is a pluralistic one, and that “even [such] a . . . society must share a core of
values, or a culture, to provide a means to live together as a society”).
262. For example, Professor Bill Ong Hing argues that there is an American culture, but
that it is an evolving one, influenced positively over time by the respective waves of immigrants
who have come since the eighteenth century, and by technology, social movements, and eco-
nomic developments.  See id. at 153-54.  Hing also suggests that the existence of an American
culture is essential, and that certain core values of that culture can be identified:
Even a multicultural society must share a core of values, or a culture, to provide a
means to live together as a society.  Without a commitment to a common core, bal-
kanization into assorted factions is likely. . . . The common core of values encom-
passes the essence of good citizenship.  It includes respect for the nation’s laws, for
its democratic political and economic system, and for equal opportunity. . . . [The ba-
sic values] are to repudiate racism, sexism, heterosexism, and class distinctions in our
daily activities; to be open, caring, and fair; and to be accepting of diversity and re-
spectful of others.
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Needless to say, these questions will not be resolved overnight, if
they are ever resolved.  Our legal history and political philosophy do,
however, provide a useful paradigm for discussing these questions.
Specifically, as I suggested in the introduction to this Article, our tra-
dition of ordered liberty, which allows for individual (and minority
group) liberty or freedom within certain culturally-defined bounds,
establishes the framework within which particular questions about
what is and is not “within the American culture” can and should be
resolved.  Over time, prevailing cultural winds have changed the elas-
tic line between the acceptable and unacceptable and allowed for
more or less liberty.263  And it is certainly the case today that the
broader American culture permits more deviation from the major-
ity’s core than was the case in the past.264  In this respect, one can say
that multiculturalism, perhaps not in its pure form but in its admoni-
tion that we “tread gently if at all upon that which is at the core of
[minority or] immigrant culture,”265 has itself become part of the
larger culture.266  Using the paradigm of ordered liberty and allowing
for its inclusion of multicultural sensitivity into the sphere of the ac-
cepted national culture permits us to engage in useful discussion
about both the outlines and the contents of that culture.
At a minimum, as the United States Commission on Immigra-
tion Reform has suggested, American culture includes constitutional
“principles and values,” including especially “equal protection and
justice under the law; freedom of speech and religion; and represen-
tative government,” as well as “[e]thnic and religious diversity based
Id. at 180.
263. See id. at 155-56 (noting that pluralism shares with liberal democracy a commitment to
“religious freedom, freedom of speech and assembly, and privacy” and describing periods in
Supreme Court history during which those freedoms have been curtailed in favor of
“assimilationist thought”).
264. The modern Supreme Court’s First Amendment cases—both under the free speech
and religion clauses—are the principal example of this contemporary liberalism.  See, e.g., Lee
v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577, 586-98 (1992) (holding impermissible under the First Amendment
the inclusions by public schools of clergymen offering nonsectarian prayers in school ceremo-
nies); R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377, 391-96 (1992) (holding statute outlawing bias-
motivated disorderly conduct unconstitutional under the First Amendment).
265. Coleman, supra note 3, at 1166.
266. See NATHAN GLAZER, WE ARE ALL MULTICULTURALISTS NOW 19-21 (1997)
(arguing that American society, for better or worse, has adopted multiculturalism into the na-
tional culture, and exploring what this new identity means for our social institutions and our
sense of national unity).
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on personal freedom.”267  While there may be some debate about
what else to include in the mix, there is no question, given the consti-
tutional limitations inherent in the doctrine of ordered liberty, that
the government cannot be in the business of dictating or even facili-
tating the inclusion of much else.
In the end, what is most extraordinary about the compromise
reached by Harborview and its immigrant patients is that it provided
“a culturally sensitive, safe alternative to the practices of female cir-
cumcision or female genital mutilation”268 within the paradigm of or-
dered liberty.  Specifically, it involved both multicultural sensitivity
(or a respect for ethnic and religious diversity) and a respect for ex-
isting domestic cultural boundaries.269  These qualities make the com-
promise, and particularly the process that led to the compromise, a
model for American society as it seeks to resolve the cultural colli-
sions that have occurred and will continue to result from progressive
immigration policies.
CONCLUSION
“We will cut the whole foreskin off a penis, but we won’t even con-
sider a cut, a sunna, cutting the prepuce, a little bloodletting [on a
girl].”270
Respect for . . . newcomers requires that we view multiculturalism as
a positive and even necessary factor in the debate about how to re-
solve [cultural] conflicts.  Without the sensitivity that multicultural-
267. U.S. COMM’N ON IMMIGRATION REFORM, supra note 8, at 5.  This is, in my view, just
another way to say that the contents of American culture are determined by the principle of
ordered liberty.  See also supra note 262 (discussing Professor Hing’s perspective on the con-
tents of American culture).
268. Dugger, supra note 18 (quoting from Harborview’s final press release and indicating
that the hospital’s role in considering the need for such an alternative “has now been con-
cluded”).
269. That the hospital’s process involved both multicultural sensitivity and a respect for the
anti-FGM position of American culture is, I think, beyond dispute.  See Ostrom, supra note 73
(quoting Dr. Abraham Bergman, Chief of Pediatrics at Harborview Medical Center, as stating
that it is “imperative to understand” cultural differences).  Indeed, Dr. Bergman’s quite public
view that, as one journalist described it, Americans “should be careful when making judgments
about the cultures of others,” Ostrom, supra note 81, drew strong criticism.  See, e.g., Barrick,
supra note 254 (noting that “a sincere religious belief is not enough to demand respect if its
product results in iniquity”).  At the same time, the hospital was clear that it would not circum-
cise girls.  This was not even an issue.  Telephone Interview with Dr. Leslie Miller, supra note
64.
270. Ostrom, supra note 81 (quoting Dr. Leslie Miller).
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ism injects into the debate, we have little hope of understanding the
social obstacles immigrants face, or of ensuring their successful inte-
gration into American society.271
While opponents of FGM are generally correct to reject cate-
gorically the merits of that practice, they were wrong to reject the
Harborview proposal.  They were wrong particularly because they
continued to ignore the deficiencies of the comparison between that
traditional practice and male circumcision, and as a result, failed to
protect any children, female or male, from medically or religiously
unnecessary genital cutting.  Saying that they had to avoid the male
circumcision issue to assure political support for their cause is no re-
sponse.272  If the law is implicated in any political position, as it is in
this one, that position must have integrity.  Avoiding the obvious ap-
plicability of the equal protection doctrine under the facts of the
Harborview proposal is intellectually dishonest.
The fact is, Harborview’s efforts to resolve what no one in the
United States has yet managed to tackle should be lauded rather than
condemned.  Not only did the hospital join together with the immi-
grant community to create a workable and positive solution to one of
the thorniest of modern cultural collisions, but it also showed that
sometimes, we can reach compromises that accommodate both the
traditional practices of non-European immigrants and the existing
norms of this culturally Western society.  Because the proposal
joined directly the theoretical concerns of cultural relativists, it also
emphasized the continuing relevance of the Equal Protection Clause
and of the doctrine of ordered liberty as we seek the proper path to
the accommodation of non-European immigrants.
Compromises of the sort reached in Seattle are not always possi-
ble in a country which attempts both to be non-discriminatory in its
immigration policies and to remain unified as to certain aspects of the
culture and legal system.  There are times when we must make
choices that result in the exclusion and condemnation of non-
conforming traditional or religious practices; traditional forms of
271. Coleman, supra note 3, at 1166.
272. Schroeder is reported to have said, for example, that the process leading to the federal
prohibition of FGM was difficult because “some legislators did not believe the procedure was
being done in this country and because some Orthodox Jews feared it would lead to criticism of
male circumcision.” Abu-Nasr, supra note 28.  Because of this fear, Schroeder sought expressly
to make clear that there was no relationship between male and female circumcision.  See id.
(“[FGM is] not like circumcision for men.  It’s much like Lorena Bobbitt.” (internal quotation
marks omitted)).
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FGM are but one example of such instances.273  On the other hand,
the facts of the Harborview case also indicate the need to exercise
caution before concluding that every cultural collision implicates such
an “either/or” solution.  What Harborview did was to ask the related
questions “Why is FGM antithetical to our own cultural tradition?”
and “Is there a way to accommodate the practice without offending
United States law?”  Asking and answering these questions allowed
them to eliminate the collision and to ensure the best possible treat-
ment for the immigrants under the dominant cultural and legal cir-
cumstances.  Replace the phrase “female genital mutilation” with
other controversial traditional practices and there is a model solution
to the problem of how to determine whether a compromise is possi-
ble.
273. I have suggested that in addition to FGM, other traditional immigrant practices pose
irreconcilable conflicts with United States law and culture, including the Hmong custom of
marriage-by-capture, the Asian custom of parent-child suicide, and other cultures’ customs that
permit violence against women and children.  See Coleman, supra note 3, at 1093-94 (providing
examples of other such traditional practices and discussing the response of the American legal
system).  It should be clear from my earlier discussion of the doctrine of ordered liberty that
some Americans (either individually or in groups) also hold values or share customs that are
inconsistent with American law and (majority) culture.  My argument applies equally to those
groups and their practices.
